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". nor cruel and unusualpunishments inflicted. "'
I. INTRODUCTION

Courts have overlooked the best and most appropriate protection against

interrogation torture that the Constitution provides: the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Analysis of this
Amendment's "lost" history, the jurisprudence surrounding the Amendment,
and its potential application to two current cases will underscore this

dramatic failure to protect liberty in the manner intended by the Framers of
our Constitution.
On May 8, 2002, Jose Padilla, a.k.a. Abdullah Al Muhajr, stepped off a3
2
plane at Chicago's O'Hare airport. Federal agents were there to greet him.
They arrested him on a warrant issued pursuant to Title 18, United States
Code Section 3144,4 alleging that he was a material witness. He was
transported to New York and appointed counsel.5 On June 9, 2002, the
government dismissed the material witness warrant against him. That same
day, Mr. Padilla was transferred from the Metropolitan Correctional Center

in New York to a military brig in South Carolina. He is presently being held

"without formal charges against him or the prospect of release after the
giving of testimony before a grand jury."6 Mr. Padilla, according to the
government, is being detained in order to interrogate him.7 Since his transfer

1. U.S. Const. amend. VIfl.
2. See Writ of Habeus Corpus at 3, Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(No. 02 Civ. 4445 (MBM)), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/padilla/
padillaus61102pet.pdf [hereinafter Padilla Writ].
3. See id.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 3144 states:
If it appears from an affidavit filed by a party that the testimony of a person is material in
a criminal proceeding, and if it is shown that it may become impracticable to secure the
presence of the person by subpoena, a judicial officer may order the arrest of the person
and treat the person in accordance with the provisions of section 3142 of this title. No
material witness may be detained because of inability to comply with any condition of
release if the testimony of such witness can adequately be secured by deposition, and if
further detention is not necessary to prevent a failure of justice. Release of a material
witness may be delayed for a reasonable period of time until the deposition of the witness
can be taken pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
5. See Padilla Writ, supra note 2, at 2.
6. Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), affid in part, rev'd in part, 352
F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 2004 WL 95802 (Feb. 20, 2004).
7. See Respondent's Brief at 50-51, Padilla v. Rumsfeld, No. 03-2235, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS
25616, at * 1 (2d Cir. Dec. 18, 2003). availableat http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/padilla/
padillarums72203gbrf.pdf. The Government cites to the Declaration of vice Admiral Lowell E.
Jacoby of the U.S. Navy, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency as an explanation of the
interrogative purposes of the detention. Id. [hereinafter Jacoby declaration]; see also Amended
Petition for Habeas Corpus at 31, Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 02

to military custody, no one, aside from his captors and interrogators, has
spoken to, seen or had access to Mr. Padilla.8 In pleadings challenging his
detention, Mr. Padilla has argued that his Due Process rights under the Fifth
Amendment have been violated. 9

On November 28, 1997, Oliverio Martinez was riding a bicycle on a
darkened path in Oxnard, California.' ° He approached two police officers
who were questioning an individual."1 Martinez was ordered "to dismount,2
spread his legs, and place his hands behind his head. [He] complied."' 14
13
After a patdown in which a knife was found, an "altercation"' ensued.
During that altercation, one of the officers "shot Martinez several times,

causing severe injuries that left Martinez permanently blinded and paralyzed
from the waist down."'' 5 Another officer, Chavez, accompanied Martinez to
the hospital and while Mr. Martinez was being treated for his injuries,
Chavez interviewed him.' 6 Martinez was never charged with a crime, 7 but
later brought a 1983 action alleging a violation of his Fifth Amendment right
to remain silent. 18 He argued that the Fifth Amendment's reference to a
"criminal case" should include police interrogation.' 9 The Court rejected
this argument.2 0 Noting that the Fifth Amendment is "a fundamental trial
right,"21 the Court concluded that "mere coercion does not violate the text of

Civ. 455) ("Respondent Rumsfeld has stated publicly that it is the Government's intention to detain
Mr. Padilla indefinitely to interrogate him."), available at http:lnews.findlaw.com/hdocsldocs/
padilla/padillabush6l9O2apet.pdf (last visited Jan. 16, 2004).
8. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THREAT OF A BAD EXAMPLE:
UNDERMINING

INTERNATIONAL

STANDARDS

AS "WAR

ON

TERROR"

DETENTIONS

CONTINUE,

available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR511142003 (last visited Feb. 2, 2004).
On February 11, 2004, the Pentagon announced that it would permit Mr. Padilla access to his
lawyers under limited conditions. See Department of Defense, PadillaAllowed Access to Lawyer,
February 11, 2004, available at http://www.defenseling.mil/releases/2004/nr20040211-0341.html
[hereinafter DOD News Release]. The Pentagon asserts that it has "no legal duty to permit access to
a lawyer." Lyle Denniston, 'Enemy Combatant' Gets Lawyer Pentagon Lifts Curb on US Citizen
Held in 'Dirty Bomb' Case, BOSTON GLOBE, February 12, 2004, at A3, available at LEXIS, News
Library, Most Recent 90 Days. Rather, the Pentagon has explained that it is permitting such access
"as a matter of discretion and military authority." id.
9. See Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 600. The author takes no position on the validity of Mr.
Padilla's claims arising under the Fifth Amendment.
10. Chavez v. Martinez, 123 S. Ct. 1994, 1999 (2003).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. There is some dispute as to what occurred during this altercation, with each side blaming the
other. Id. at 1999 n.l.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1999.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 2000.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. The Court remanded the case for a determination of whether Mr. Martinez could "pursue a
claim of liability for a substantive due process violation." Id. at 2008.
21. Id. at 2001 (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990).
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the Self-Incrimination Clause absent use of the compelled statements in a
criminal case.

22

Cases like those of Padilla and Martinez are usually not analyzed under
the Eighth Amendment.
However, given the genesis of the Eighth
Amendment and its subsequent application and interpretation by United
States courts, it appears that the cruel and unusual punishment clause was

designed to provide protection or relief in these two situations.
The Eighth Amendment states that "[e]xcessive bails shall not be

required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted. '23 This clause, "like the other great clauses of the Constitution, is
not susceptible to precise definition. 24 As noted by Chief Justice Burger in
his dissent in the landmark case of Furman v. Georgia, "of all our
fundamental guarantees, the ban on 'cruel and unusual punishments' is one
of the most difficult to translate into judicially manageable terms. ' 2 This
sentiment has been echoed by numerous commentators and courts.26 In spite
of this ambiguity and the paucity of interpretations and applications of this
clause during the first one hundred years of our nation, 7 it appears that the

amendment was specifically intended to cover not only legislative
pronouncements of post-conviction punishment but also interrogations that
are barbarous.28 While the primary intent of the amendment was to prohibit
cruel and unusual post-conviction punishment, a careful reading of the
history of this amendment and interpretations by the Supreme Court of the
concept of "punishment" suggest that it should apply more broadly than
previously accepted and, in fact, was meant to protect against coercive and
barbarous interrogations.

22. Id. at 2002 (emphasis added).
23. U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
24. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 260 n.2 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
25. Id. at 376 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
26. See. e.g., Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-136 (1878) ("Difficulty would attend the
effort to define with exactness the extent of the constitutional provision which provides that cruel
and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted."); THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 402 (n.p.,
Little, Brown, and Co. 1890) ("It is certainly difficult to determine precisely what is meant by cruel
and unusual punishments."); ROBERT A. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1776-1791,
at II (Northeastern Univ. Press 1955) ("Exactly what the prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment forbade was also a questionable point.").
27. See, e.g., Pressly Millen, Note, Interpretation of the Eighth Amendment-Rummel, Solem,
and the Venerable Case of Weems v. United States, 1984 DUKE L.J. 789, 792 (1984) ("[Blecause of
the infrequency with which eighth amendment claims have arisen and because of the often bizarre
nature of the few cases which reach the Supreme Court, the judicial gloss on the clause is meager.").
Perhaps the best explanation for the infrequency of its application in the first century after its
adoption is that the Court did not apply it to the actions of the states. See Pervear v. Commonweath,
72 U.S. 475 (1866). However, that changed with the Court's ruling in Robinson v.California,370
U.S. 660 (1962), which made its application to the states clear.
28. See Millen, supra note 27.

Though seldom applied during the century after enactment, since the
Eighth Amendment's application to the states, the courts have been faced
with numerous challenges and have attempted to refine its definition and
application. 29 These cases have misguidedly limited the application of the
protections of this amendment to post-conviction punishments. 30 However,
this limitation is unjustified given the history and concerns of the Framers of
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, which led to the adoption of this
amendment.
In this article, I will analyze the origins of the language of the Eighth
Amendment and the process that led to its inclusion by the Framers in the
Bill of Rights. I will also discuss the meaning of the Eighth Amendment
language prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment. Through this analysis
and discussion, I will demonstrate that the proscription against cruel and
unusual punishment was intended to protect against coercive interrogation.
Finally, I will discuss the ramifications of this conclusion for those detained
for the purposes of information gathering by the government and those
interrogated but against whom criminal charges are not brought.
II. COERCIVE INTERROGATIONS AND THE PROSCRIPTION AGAINST CRUEL
AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT

The historical underpinnings of the Eighth Amendment make clear that
when the framers of the Bill of Rights were considering the Eighth
Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishments, among
their traditionally recognized concerns, 3 ' they were equally concerned with
and intended the clause to protect against "the use of torture for the purpose
,,31
of eliciting confessions....
The ideals which were eventually embodied in the Eighth Amendment
can be traced back to "as early as 1042 in the laws of Edward the Confessor,
and also in the Magna Carta. 33 It is universally acknowledged that the
specific language of the Eighth Amendment was drawn from Article 10 of

29. In Robinson, the Court applied the protections of the Eighth Amendment to the states through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666-68. Since that
time, the frequency of challenges arising under the Eighth Amendment has risen dramatically. See
Arthur B. Berger, Note, Wilson v. Seiter: An Unsatisfying Attempt at Resolving the Imbroglio of
Eighth Amendment Prisoners' Rights Standards, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 565, 570-71 ("It was not until
1962, when the Supreme Court applied the Eighth Amendment to state action through the Fourteenth
Amendment in Robinson v. California,that Eighth Amendment litigation began booming.").
30. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
31. In this article, I am not asserting that application of the Eighth Amendment is inappropriate
to evaluate the constitutionality of the penalty imposed for a criminal offense. Rather, I believe that
courts and commentators have erroneously and unjustifiably limited the application of this
Amendment to those circumstances.
32. Furman, 408 U.S. at 260 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring).
33. Recent Cases, Constitutional Law-Cruel and Unusual Punishment Provision of Eighth
Amendment as Restriction Upon State Action Through the Due Process Clause, 34 MINN. L. REV.
134, 135 (1950).

666

[Vol. 31: 661, 2004]

Lost Origins of the Eighth Amendment
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

the English Bill of Rights of 1689, 34 which stated, "'[t]hat excessive bail
ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed; nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.' '3 5 The prohibition contained in that provision,
however, was known to influential colonial thinkers much earlier than
1689.36
A. The Originsof the Prohibitionon this Continent
The origins of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment on
this continent took root as early as 1641, in the Massachusetts Body of
Liberties.37 Language reminiscent of the Eighth Amendment was first
introduced into the laws of Massachusetts by Reverend Nathaniel Ward.38
Ward, a minister, had also been trained in the law. 39
After being
"suspended, excommunicated and deprived of his benefice" in England,
Ward came to Massachusetts. n° While he was there, a period of political
unrest ensued. Following some of this upheaval in the Massachusetts
colony, a series of committees was established. The purpose of these
committees was to develop or "frame a body of grounds of laws, in
resemblance to a Magna Charta, which ... should be received for
fundamental laws.",41 Reverend Ward was appointed to one of these
committees. In 1641, a proposed code which Reverend Ward drafted was
circulated and ultimately enacted "under the title Body of Liberties. 4 2 This

34. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 966 (1991) ("There is no doubt that the
Declaration of Rights is the antecedent of our constitutional text."); see also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 100 (1958) ("The phrase in our Constitution was taken directly from the English Declaration of
Rights of 1688, and the principle it represents can be traced back to the Magna Carta."); Note, The
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the Substantive Criminal Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 635,
636 (1966) ("The ban on cruel and unusual punishments found in the eighth amendment and almost
all state constitutions was drawn from the English Declaration of Rights of 1688."). The English
Declaration of Rights of 1688 became the Bill of Rights of 1689. See RICHARD L. PERRY, SOURCES
OF OUR LIBERTY 222-23 (American Bar Foundation 1959).
35. Bill of Rights (1689), reprinted in PERRY, supra note 34, at 247.
36. See generally Recent Cases, supra note 33; Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Inflicted:" The OriginalMeaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 848 (1969).
37. Massachusetts Body of Liberties (1641), reprinted in BERNARD SCHWARTZ, I THE BILL OF
RIGHTS, A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 71 (Chelsea House 1971); see also Recent Cases, supra note

33, at 135 ("It appears as early as 1641 in the Massachusetts Body of Liberties and was given the
force of law in the Laws and Liberties of 1648."). See also Granucci, supra note 36, at 848.
38. F.C. Gray, Remarks on the Early Laws of Massachusetts Bay, reprinted in COLLECTION OF
THE MASSACHUSE'TTrS HISTORICAL SOCIETY 193 (n.p., 3d Series 1843); R. Carter Pittman, The

Colonial Constitutional History of the PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L.
REV. 763, 768 (1935) (noting that the draftsman of this document was Nathaniel Ward); see also
Granucci, supra note 36, at 850.
39. Granucci, supra note 36, at 850 ("Ward soon abandoned the law for ministry.").
40. Id. at 850.
41. 1 WINTHROP'S JOURNAL "HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND" 1630-1649 151 (J. Hosmer ed.,
Scribner's Sons 1908).
42. Granucci, supra note 36, at 851.

code has been recognized as "the most important as a forerunner of the
federal Bill of Rights."43 The Body of Liberties prohibited "Barbarous and
inhumane" torture" and "bodilie punishments. 45
The prohibition that Ward drafted for this code can be traced back to the

writings of Englishman Robert Beale.46 This is well documented in Anthony
Granucci's groundbreaking article on the subject. 47, Sir Robert Beale had
been a member of the High Commission which had been turned into an
ecclesiastical court and had used "torture to extract confessions., 48 The

High Commission was the court set up to try certain types of ecclesiastical
offenses. 4 9 Beale resigned from this court because of its inquisitorial
methods and because of his Puritan beliefs.50 Beale objected to the use of
torture "when authorized by the royal prerogative" and other inquisitorial
methods.51 Later Beale published a manuscript in which, among other
things, he condemned the use of torture by the High Commission.52 In

43.

SCHWARTZ, supra note 37, at 69.

44. Id. at 77 (quoting the Body of Liberties, supra note 37). This document permitted the use of
torture under certain limited circumstances. These circumstances were apparently rejected by
Mason in his subsequent drafting of the Eighth Amendment which he viewed as prohibiting all
torture, whether barbarous or inhumane and whenever inflicted. See 3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, DEBATES
452 (n.p., 2d ed. 1836).
45. See PERRY, supra note 34, at 153. As noted, this code allowed torture to induce a confession
so long as the person subjected to such tortured was "first fullie convicted by cleare and suffitient
evidence to be guilty... [and] that "it is very apparent there be other conspiratours, or confederates
with him... yet not with such Tortures as be Barbarous and inhumane." Id.
46. Granucci, supra note 36, at 851. Granucci noted that "Ward was nearly 23 when Beale died
and he must surely have had access to Beale's work during his schooling. Certainly Beale was well
known among Puritan law students and attorneys." Id.
47. id. A search of the Westlaw Federal Court case database reveals 219 cases which refer to
this article. Ithas been cited by Supreme Court Justices of such divergent views of the Eighth
Amendment as Justice Marshall in Furman v Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 316 (1972), and Justice Scalia
in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991). It appears safe to say that virtually every scholar
who has written on the Eighth Amendment's original meaning since 1969 has cited Granucci's
work. See, e.g., Arthur J. Goldberg & Alan M. Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty
Unconstitutional,83 HARV. L. REV. 1773, 1785 n.55 (1970) ("On the intentions of the framers, see
Granucci ....); but see Stephan T. Parr, Symmetric Proportionality:A New Perspective on the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, 68 TENN. L. REV. 41, 44-45 (2000) (criticizing Granucci's
conclusion that proportionality was intended to be covered by Article 10 of the English Bill of
Rights of 1689).
48. Granucci, supra note 36, at 848; see also DAWLEY, JOHN WHITGIFr AND THE ENGLISH
REFORMATION 165 (Scribners 1954) (describing the activity of this High Commission, Dawley
noted that "chroniclers of dissent have called the 'violent and illegal methods' of a 'despotice regime
of tyranny,' directed by 'the Jeffreys of the ecclesiastical bench,' [which was operated by] a man
who 'embodied the worst passions of an intolerant state-priest, and stood out in the history of
protestant non-conformity as worthy of especial reprobation."').
49. DAVID OGG, ENGLAND IN THE REIGNS OF JAMES II AND WILLIAM III 175 (Oxford Univ.
Press 1955) (discussing the reformed High Commission established by James in 1868, Ogg noted
that the Ecclesiastical Commissioner had the power "to exercise all manner of jurisdiction in all
cases touching any spiritual or ecclesiastical matter .....
50. Granucci, supra note 36, at 848.
51. Id. at 849; see also Robert Beale, in THE DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY (Oxford
Univ Press 1921-27).
52. See DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, supra note 51 ("Thus, we know that he
published a work impugning the right of the crown to tine or imprison for ecclesiastical offenses,
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response to this, Whitgift, the architect of the High Commission, had a
"Schedule of Misdemeanors" drawn up against Beale for condemning such
things as the use of the rack as "cruel, barbarous, [and] contrary to law. 53
Given the influence Beale had on Ward, it appears that Ward's
language, used in the Massachusetts Body of Liberties, was motivated by
concerns about torture that was used to extract confessions in the absence of
a conviction 54 and bodily punishments that were "inhumane Barbarous or
cruel. ' 55 The meaning of this document is made clearer when considered
along with the interpretations of the government officials attempting to
implement it at the time.
In explaining the meaning of the proscriptions contained in the Body of
Liberties, ministers to then Massachusetts governor Bradford specifically
used the word "punishment" when referring to torturous interrogation. 6 Mr.
Partich explained:
A magistrate is bound-to sifte ye accused and by force of
argument to draw him to an acknowledgmente of ye truth; but he
may not extracte a confession-by any violent means-by any
punishmente inflicted or threatened to be inflicted for so he may
draw forth an acknowledgmente of a crime from a fearful inocente.
John Reynor explained, "To inflicte some punishment meerly for this
reason, to extracte a confession of a capitall crime, is contrary to ye nature of
vindictive justice ....57
Based on this historical record, it is clear that the Body of Liberties was
motivated by and intended to prevent conduct that included such punishment
as torturous interrogations.
B. The Birth of the Words-English Bill of Rights Article 10
In the late 17th century, England was at the end of the "shaky reign of
King James 11.,"58 Abuses during "[t]he reign of James II, and to a lesser
extent that of Charles II, provided the historical background of the

and condemning the use of torture to induce confession, and followed it up at a later date with a
second treatise upon the same subject."); see also Granucci, supra note 36, at 849.
53.

1 JOHN STRYPE, THE LIFE AND AcTs OF JOHN WHITGIFT 402 (n.p., Franklin Publisher 1822);

see also Granucci, supra note 36, at 849-850 ("Beale's objections to the use of torture and
inquisitorial methods became more and more strident-one of his contemporaries described Beale as
'homo vehemens, et autere acerbus' and he was eventually banished from the Royal Court in
1592.").
54. See PERRY, supra note 34.

55.
56.
57.
58.

See id. at 153.
Pittman, supra note 38, at 778.
Id. (emphasis added).
Granucci, supra note 36, at 852.

669

provisions of the Bill of Rights. '

59

After James II fled England, parliament
drew up a declaration of rights "which the new monarchs, William and
Mary, would ratify. 6 °
This document was designed "to prevent a
recurrence of recent events" in England. 61 As noted above, Article 10 of the
Bill of Rights stated "[t]hat excessive Baile ought not to be required nor
62
excessive Fines imposed nor cruell and unusuall Punishments inflicted.,
Less than one hundred years later, this language would be "transcribed
verbatim into the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776 and, with the
substitution of 'shall' for 'ought, ' ' 63 it became the Eighth Amendment.
Because of this clear link, when interpreting the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment, historians and courts alike have tried to discern the meaning of
the phrase in England at the time it was adopted there. 64
The debate about the meaning of these words at the time when the
English Bill of Rights was adopted centers around whether the provision was
a reaction to the "Bloody Assizes ' 65 or to the trial of Titus Oates. 66 Justice
Scalia has asserted that the "best historical evidence suggests" that it was the
trial of Titus Oates that gave rise to the language in the English Bill of
Rights.67 In so concluding, Justice Scalia suggested that the prohibition was
limited to illegal post-conviction sentences. The resolution of this historical

59. PERRY, supra note 34, at 224; see also Bill of Rights (1689), Preamble, reprinted in
SCHWARTZ, supra note 37. at 41 (specifically identifying King James 1I as the cause of the troubles
that gave rise to the document).
60. Granucci, supra note 36, at 852: see also SCHWARTZ, supra note 37, at 41.
61. OGG, supra note 49, at 241. Unfortunately, historians are unclear exactly which events it
was designed to prevent from recurring.
One of the most serious grievances which the document sought to correct was the use of
the royal prerogative for the purpose of suspending and dispensing with laws. In the past
English kings had often exercised without question a rather vague dispensing power, that
is. a power of making exceptions to the laws in particular cases.
PERRY, supra note 34, at 224.
62. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 966.
63. Granucci, supra note 36, at 853.
64. See, e.g., Granucci, supra note 36; see also Note, What is Cruel and Unusual Punishment. 24
HARV. L. REV. 54 (1910); Steve Bachman, Starting Again with the Mayflower... England's Civil
WarandAmerica's Bill of Rights. 20 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 193 (2000); Harmelin, 501 U.S. 957.

65. See PERRY, supra note 34. at 236 n.103. The Bloody Assizes refers to the commission set up
"following the Duke of Monmouth's abortive rebellion in 1685." Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 968. This
"special commission led by Jeffreys tried, convicted, and executed hundreds of suspected
insurgents." Id. See generally SIR EDWARD PARRY, THE BLOODY ASSIZE (Dodd, Mead & Co.
1929).
66. Granucci, supra note 36, at 853-860. The Trial of Titus Oates refers to the trial for perjury of
Titus Oates. See T.B. Howell, The Second Trial of Titus Oates, in A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF
STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS

1227 (William S. Hein & Co. 2000). Oates had testified as to the "'Popish Plot' to overthrow King
Charles II in 1679." Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 969. His testimony was later discredited and he was
convicted of perjury in a trial presided over by Jeffreys. His judgment and sentence were later
criticized by members of the House of Lords as being "cruel, barbarous and illegal." Id. at 971. In
this author's review, the Bill of Rights of 1689 was likely not a result of either the Bloody Assizes or
the Trial of Titus Oates, but rather the combination of both.
67. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 968. This debate is important in that if Article 10 was bom of broader
concerns than the irregularities that occurred in the Trial of Titus Oates, it was designed to protect
against broader harms.
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debate is not as clear as Justice Scalia suggested in Harmelin.68 While it
seems likely true that the first usage of similar phraseology appeared in
debates relating to Titus Oates in the House of Lords, wherein the statement
of dissenting judges uses the phrase "cruel, barbarous, and illegal
judgments, 69 the actual language in the Bill of Rights of 1689 suggests its
roots are broader than this narrow focus on Titus Oates indicates.
To begin with, the objection can be traced back to the concerns of Sir
Robert Beale, which included both the use of torture and inquisitorial
methods. 70 Furthermore, the preamble to the Bill of Rights of 1689 speaks
in the plural when listing the complaints that gave rise to it.7I The preamble
refers to "prosecutions in the court of the King's bench, for matters and
causes cognizable only in parliament; and by divers other arbitrary and
illegal courses."" Finally, the same language used in the English Bill of
Rights was understood at the time to include more than just post-conviction
punishments that were beyond that authorized by Parliament.
This latter point becomes evident when one considers that the same year
that the English Bill of Rights was enacted, the Scottish Parliament also
enacted a similar measure to address the excesses of the same King. That
document, the Scottish Claim of Right, specifically used the word
punishment when referring to torturous interrogation. 73 The Claim of Right
of 1689 stated "[t]hat the forcing of Leiges to depone against themselves in
capital crimes, however the punishment be restricted is contrary to law.",74 It
further stated "[t]hat the using of torture without evidence or in ordinary
crimes, is contrary to law."75

There is no doubt that in the years before the enactment of the Bill of
Rights of 1689, torture had been widely used by courts to extract
confessions.76 This is exemplified by Lord Jeffreys who bore responsibility

68. Though Scalia is correct that Granucci concluded that it was the Oates affair that gave rise to
the notion that it was barbarous post-trial penalties sentences that were at issue, this conclusion does
not account for the fact, as Granucci noted, that the concept can be traced back to Sir Robert Beale's
-objections to the use of torture and inquisitorial methods." Granucci, supra note 36, at 849.
69. Harmelin. 501 U.S. at 971.

70. See Granucci. supra note 36, at 848-49.
71.

Bill of Rights (1689), Preamble, reprinted in PERRY, supra note 34, at 245.

72. Id. This clearly refers to multiple actions by the bench, rather than the one trial of Titus
Oates.
73.

Claim of Right (1689),

reprinted in GORDON

DONALDSON,

SCOT7rSH

HISTORICAL

DOCUMENTS 252-258 (Barnes & Noble, Inc. 1970) [hereinafter Claim of Right].
74. Id. This author has reviewed three sources for the Scottish Claim of Right. See Pittman,
supra note 38, at 764 n.3; Claim of Right Act 1689, available at http://www.rahbarnes.demon.co.uk
/clai1689.htm. Each of these documents contains different punctuation; however, the language
remained the same. Given the language of this provision, its meaning does not change as a result of
those punctuation variations.
75. Claim of Right. supranote 73. at 256.
76.

See DAVID JARDINE. A READING ON THE USE OF TORTURE IN THE CRIMINAL LAW OF

ENGLAND (n.p. Baldwin & Cradock 1837). Jardine states that the last record of a torture warrant

for many of the excesses of the court of King James.77 Of the notorious
Lord Jeffreys, it has been said "his methods of dragging the evidence he
wanted out of an unwilling witness, would have inspired admiration among
the modem professors of 'the third degree."' 78 Significantly, unlike the other
"barbarous" punishments which occurred during the Bloody Assizes, and
which continued after the Bill of Rights of 1689,' 9 inquisitorial proceedings
ceased around this time. 80 By the turn of the eighteenth century, compelled

confessions had largely disappeared. 81 In spite of this, scholars have relied
upon the Oates case to conclude that the phrase "seems to have meant a
severe punishment unauthorized by statute and not within the jurisdiction of
the court to impose"8 2 and a "reiteration of the English policy against
disproportionate penalties."83
Since there is no clear limitation as to which harms gave rise to the
concerns expressed in the English Bill of Rights of 1689, and there were
concerns about the "arbitrary and illegal courses ' 84 used in prosecutions by
these courts, which in the past had turned to torture to extract confessions,
the historical record does not support Justice Scalia's assertion in Harmelin.
The English drafters of the Bill of Rights of 1689 were likely also reacting
against and attempting to limit cruel and unusual punishments that involved
the use of torture to extract confessions.85

issued under royal prerogative in England was in 1641. Id. at 57. However, torture clearly appears
to have been occurring under the same King, during this time period in Scotland. See Claim of Right
supra note 73.
77. See PERRY, supra note 34, at 236 n. 103. "Jeffreys is best known for presiding over the
'Bloody Assizes' following the Duke of Monmouth's abortive rebellion in 1685; a special
commission led by Jeffreys tried, convicted, and executed hundreds of suspected insurgents."
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 968.
78. PARRY, supra note 65, at 195. This reputation is interesting in that there appears to be no
specific record of torture warrants being issued by royal prerogative after the High Commission was
re-established in 1661. See generally JARDINE, supra note 76.
79. This fact is important in that it is this continued use of such post-conviction punishments that
has given rise to the belief that it was not the Bloody Assizes. but rather the trial of Titus Oates that
was the impetus for Article 10. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 968.
80. See, e.g., M. Macnair, The Early Development of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 10
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUDIES 66, 72 (1990).

81. See Lawrence Herman, The Unexplored Relationship Between the Privilege Against
Compulsory Self-Incrimination and the Involuntary Confession Rule (Part1), 53 OHIO ST. L. J. 101,
147 (1992); United States v. Gecas, 120 F.3d 1419, 1450 (1997).
82. Granucci, supra note 36, at 859.
83. Id. at 860.
84. Bill of Rights (1689), Preamble, reprinted in PERRY, supra note 34, at 245.
85. Scholars have suggested that the failure to specifically mention torturous and compulsory
interrogation is evidence that this practice was no longer a concern by the time of the enactment of
the Bill of Rights of 1689. See, e.g., Pittman, supra note 38, at 774 (quoting MACAULEY, 3 HISTORY
OF ENGLAND 265) (asserting that any reference to torture was unnecessary in the Bill of Rights
which was already considered a "distinguishing feature of the English jurisprudence."). The notion
that coerced confessions were no longer a problem in the late 1600s has been discounted by recent
scholars. See, e.g., Steven Penney, Theories of Confession Admissibility: A HistoricalView, 25 AM.
J. CRIM. L. 309, 316-317 (1998); Macnair, supra note 80. This assertion is also contradicted by the
fact that the same year this document was drafted, 1689, the Scottish Claim of Right was drafted to
prohibit torture in most interrogations. Claim of Right, supra note 73, at 256. A possible
explanation for the lack of specific reference to torture may be that the drafters anticipated that the
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C. The Framers Understoodthe Eighth Amendment to Include a Ban on
InterrogationTorture
Whatever the meaning of the language of Article 10 of the Bill of Rights
of 1689, to the Framers, the Eighth Amendment certainly was designed to
prevent torturous interrogations.
As is well known, when originally
proposed for ratification, the Constitution contained no bill of rights.86 One

of the key states in the ratification of the proposed new constitution was
Virginia.87 Given the position of the Virginia delegates at the Constitutional

Convention and the post-convention pamphleteering, there was concern that
Virginia would not pass the constitution without a bill of rights.88

Virginia became a key state in this ratification process because it was
both one of "the most powerful of the American colonies" 89 and it was the
first of the colonies to draft its own bill of rights. 90 This earlier bill of rights
drafted in Virginia was promulgated in 1776. 9' At that time, George Mason
and Patrick Henry were appointed to a committee that was formed following
the Virginia convention that resolved to send delegates to the Continental
Congress. 92 That committee's purpose was to propose the declaration of
independence from Great Britain and to prepare a declaration of rights for
the Virginia colony. 93 Though the committee proposed many bills of rights
and constitutions, "[tihe declaration of rights and constitution proposed by
George Mason ... 'swallowed up all the rest, by fixing the grounds and
94
plan, which after great discussion and correction, were finally ratified."'

language of the Bill of Rights taken as a whole would prohibit it. Specifically, Article 3, which
prohibited the High Commission and Article 10 which prohibited barbarous punishments, when
taken together eliminated the offending court and the offending practice, respectively.
86.

IRVING BRANT. THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ITS ORIGIN AND MEANING 39 (Bobbs-Merrill Co.

1965).
87. Id. at 40. The other state was New York. Id.
88. RUTLAND, supra note 26, at 159-178.
89. Id. at 39.
90. Id.: see also HELEN HILL MILLER, GEORGE MASON CONSTITUTIONALIST 138 (Harvard
University Press 1939) (Mason wrote, "This Declaration of Rights was the first in America .. ");
ROBERT RUTLAND, "WELL ACQUAINTED WITH BOOKS": THE FOUNDING FATHERS OF 1787, at 11

(Lib. of Cong. 1987).
91. MILLER, supra note 90, at 129-151; B. Wright, Jr.. Written Constitutions in America,
reprinted in ESSAYS INHISTORY AND POLITICAL THEORY 364-365 (Harv. Univ. Press 1936).
92. RUTLAND. supra note 26, at 32.
93. H. B. GRIGSBY, THE VIRGINIA CONVENTION OF 1776, at 18 (n.p., J.W. Randolph 1855)

(quoting from the Journal of Convention 1776, "Resolved, unanimously, That a committee be
appointed to prepare a Declaration of Rights, and such a plan of government as will be most likely to
maintain peace and order in this Colony, and secure substantial and equal liberty to the people.");

RUTLAND, supra note 26, at 33 ("A sister resolution to the independency instructions called for a
committee to prepare a declaration of rights and a plan of government."); Granucci, supra note 36, at
840.
94. Edmund Randolph's Essay on the Revolutionary History of Virginia, reprinted in
SCHWARTZ, supra note 37, at 247; see also MILLER, supra note 90, at 144 (quoting from a letter
written by James Madison which confirmed that both the Virginia Constitution and its Declaration of
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Thus, George Mason's proposals were ultimately adopted in Virginia.9 5
These "forward looking ' 96 proposals included a verbatim copy of the
English Bill of Rights Article 10 prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishments.9 7 Other colonies followed suit, drawing up their own bills of
rights. 98 Many of these other bills of rights contained provisions that
addressed the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in some
form or another. 99 Such a proscription was also included in the Northwest
Ordinance. 0 0 The inclusion of a bill of rights, including its proscription
against cruel and unusual punishment, in this piece of national legislation,
has been cited as an example that "the bill of rights introduced in
revolutionary Virginia had run a full course through the Union and was in
effect passed on to those states yet to come."''
It is against this backdrop that the delegates to the Philadelphia
convention met to draw up the plan for the formation of a federal
government. In preparation for this Constitutional Convention, James
Madison compiled a list of suggested reading for the delegates. Included in
Madison's suggested reading list for members of the Continental Congress
was "the Italian Beccaria, who did more than any other man to arouse
Europe to the monstrous
nature of torture and other forms of compulsory
02
self-incrimination." 1
Also included in Madison's list was Blackstone's Commentaries on the
Laws of England.10 3 It has been said that "almost two-thirds of the delegates
had cut their eyeteeth" on this book.1°4 Furthermore, "[e]very lawyer on the
Convention floor knew [Blackstone] as well as his own handwriting."'0'
This becomes important when analyzing the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment because the word "punishment" is used in Blackstone's

Rights were "from the same hand," that of George Mason.).
95. See MILLER, supra note 90, at 139 (stating that the clause whose language ultimately became
the Eighth Amendment was "derived from the catalogue of British abuses which [Mason] drew up as
part of the Fairfax Resolves").
96. See id.
97. Granucci, supra note 36, at 841; see also RUTLAND, supra note 26, at 38-39. Given this link
to the Bill of Rights of 1689. it is interesting to note that George Mason's grandfather "was one of
the most outspoken against the doctrines of James II." MILLER. supra note 90. at 6.
98. RUTLAND, supra note 26, at 79.
99. See, e.g., Del. Decl. of Rights 16 (1776); Berger, supra note 29, at 569 ("Eight other states
subsequently adopted the clause before it was eventually embraced in 1791 as the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.").
100. The Ordinance of 1787, III, Art. Hl,reprinted in JAY AMOS BARRETT, EVOLUTION OF THE
ORDINANCE OF 1787, at 87 (n.p., G. P. Putnam's Sons 1891). See also RUTLAND, supra note 26, at
103. George Mason played an important role in the admission of the Northwest Territory. It was his
draft settlement that "became the basic document upon which ... the American Congress, under
Jefferson's leadership, framed the Northwest Ordinance and provided for the constitution and
admission to the Union of Indiana, Ohio, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin and part of Minnesota."
MILLER, supra note 90, at 166.
101. RUTLAND, supra note 26, at 105.
102. BRANT, supra note 86, at 32-33.
103. Id. at 33; RUTLAND, supra note 26, at 11, 12.
104. RUTLAND, supra note 26, at 11.
105. Id. at 12. Thirty four of the fifty-five delegates were lawyers. Id. at 11-13.
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Commentaries on the Law in reference to pretrial torture to secure
statements. In discussing arraignments and the history of torture to secure
statements, it states: "It hath been doubted, whether this punishment
subsisted

at common

law ....

,0

Thus,

it appears

that the

word

"punishment" was understood at the time to include torturous interrogation.
This definition does not contradict the definition of "punishment" in
legal dictionaries from the eighteenth century. Justice Thomas has asserted
in his dissent in Helling v. McKinney, that as a legal term of art, the word
"punishment" was limited to post-conviction punishment because it was
defined at the time as those actions undertaken as a "penalty for
transgressing the Law."' 17 However, this definition, on its own terms, is not
limited to post-adjudication punishment, but rather to those penalties used
against transgressors. Justice Scalia has suggested that the definition of
"punishment" at the time of the adoption of the Eighth Amendment was
broader than that stated by Justice Thomas. In Wilson v. Seiter,10 8 Justice
Scalia stated that "[tihe infliction of punishment is a deliberate act intended
to chastise or deter. This is what the word means today; it is what it meant
in the eighteenth century."' 0 9 Neither of these definitions limits the
application of this amendment to those adjudicated guilty of a criminal
offense."o In fact, any suggestion that these definitions limit the application
of the Eighth Amendment to post-conviction punishment is proven to be an

106.

4 W. BLACKSTONE. COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: A FACSIMILE OF THE FIRST

EDITION OF 1765-1769, at *322 (emphasis added) (In discussing the arraignment procedures,
Blackstone referred to the use of such things as the use of the rack and the torture of penance to
extract confessions. In discussing the history of these tortures, Blackstone stated. "It hath been
doubted whether this punishment subsisted at the common law, or was introduced in consequence of
the statute ... which seems to be the better opinion.").
107. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25. 38 (1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also V THE LAW
DICTIONARY 343 (1 Riley N.Y. 1811). Justice Thomas also included two other definitions including
"[any infliction imposed in vengeance of a crime and [a]ny pain or suffering inflicted on a person
for a crime or offense." Helling, 509 U.S. at 38. None of these definitions required a judgment to be
entered before such punishment could occur.
108. 501 U.S. 294(1991).
109. Id. at 300 (citing Duckworth v. Franzen. 780 F.2d 645. 652 (7th Cir. 1985)). Duckworth
follows this quote with a definition from Samuel Johnson's Dictionar, of the English Language of
1755 which defines "punishment' as "[any infliction or pain imposed in vengeance of a crime."
110. Furthermore, a question of relevance is raised by reliance on legal dictionaries, given that a
number of the Framers, though learned men, were not trained lawyers. This includes both James
Madison, the proponent of the Eighth Amendment, and George Mason, the drafter of the wording of
the Eighth Amendment. See RUTLAND, supra note 26, at 14. See also MILLER, supra note 90, at 12
("[T]here is no record that [George Mason] went away even to college."). However, Mason's
education included training by the lawyer John Mercer. Id. Should the definition from legal
dictionaries control over the intent of the Framers and the common understanding of the word
punishment? It is perhaps this lack of legal training that accounts for the expansive and common use
of the word punishment by the Framers. While a lawyer may mean only those actions that are taken
as a result of a criminal conviction, a layperson might believe punishment encompassed the common
meaning and believe it applied to such things as torturous interrogation.
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anachronistic distinction of history when one considers Blackstone's use of
the term "punishment."
Because there is ample evidence that the Framers intended the clause to
apply more broadly than simply to post-conviction punishment,"' and this is
supported by the usage of the word "punishment" at the time and the
definition of punishment in common language dictionaries,' 12 "punishment"
should be construed more broadly than simply penalties inflicted as the
result of a criminal adjudications.
In any event, the exact meaning of the word punishment was not
discussed during the Constitutional convention because there was no need,
given the absence of a bill of rights in the Constitution. Instead, during the
convention, the "overriding topic.., was the powers of the federal
government-not individual liberty,""' 3 as contained in the bills of rights. It
was not until late in the convention that the delegates' attention was brought
to the need for a bill of rights.' 14 Not surprisingly, this call to "attend to the
rights of every class of the people""' 5 came from George Mason.
When, at Mason's request, a motion was made to form a committee to
draft a bill of rights, the only opposition stated that such was not necessary
because the state constitutions already included these protections. 16 Mason
pointed out that given the federal Constitution and the supremacy of federal
law over state law, that would no longer be true." 17 However, ultimately,
Mason's request for a bill of rights and his attempts to interject some of
these principles into the constitution during the convention were
unsuccessful. 18 As a result, he was so concerned that the "powerful federal
government being created would become oppressive"" 9 that he said he
"would sooner chop off his right hand than put it to the Constitution as it
[then stood]."' 12
After the debates ended, the constitution passed
12 1
unanimously with three members, including George Mason, abstaining.
The proposed constitution was then passed on to the individual states to
vote on its adoption. During the ratification process, a fight ensued between
the Federalists and the Anti-federalists, the latter raising the lack of a bill of
rights as their primary complaint about the proposed constitution. 22 When it

111. See supra notes 104-110 and accompanying text.
112. See infra Part III(A)(I).
113. RUTLAND, supra note 26, at 107.

114. Id. at 115-16.
115.

1

MAx

FARRAND,

RECORDS

OF

THE

FEDERAL

CONVENTION

49,

available

at

http://memory.loc.gov/1/1fr/001/0000/00790049.tif.
116. RUTLAND, supra note 26, at 116; FARRAND, supra note 115 ("Mr. Sherman was for securing
the rights of the people where requisite. The State Declarations of Rights are not repealed by this
Constitution; and being in force are sufficient.").
117. FARRAND, supra note 115 ("The Laws of the U.S. are to be paramount to the State Bills of
Rights.").
118. RUTLAND, supra note 26, at 117.

119.
120.
121.
122.
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Id. at 115.
Id. at 118.
Id. at 126-158.
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came time for Virginia to ratify the constitution, there was a great concern
that it would not be approved due to the strength of the
opposition on a
123
number of issues, most notably, its lack of a bill of rights.
There was extensive debate on the need for a bill of rights with Patrick
Henry as one of the most vocal objectors to the adoption of the Constitution
as drafted. 2 4 When the Virginia delegates met to debate the proposed
Constitution, Henry, fearing among other things, the use of "torturing to
extort a confession" complained about the lack of a prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishments in the federal constitution. 125 Henry stated:
In this business of legislation, your members of Congress will loose
the restriction of not imposing excessive fines, demanding excessive
bail, and inflicting cruel and unusual punishments. These are
prohibited by your declaration of rights. What has distinguished our
ancestors?-That they would not admit of tortures, or cruel and
barbarous punishment. But Congress may introduce the practice of
the civil law, in preference to that of the common law. They may
introduce the practice of France, Spain, and Germany-of

torturing, to extort a confession of the crime. They will say that
they might as well draw examples from those countries as from

Great Britain, and they will tell you that there is such a necessity
of strengthening the arm of government, that they must have a
criminal equity, and extort confession by torture, in order to
punish with still more relentless severity. We are then lost and
undone.126
George Nicholas then responded that a bill of rights "provided no
security against torture... for it has been repeatedly infringed and

123. Id. at 165-74. Virginia was a critical state in the ratification process for "[w]ithout the
concurrence of Virginia and New York, however, no permanent union or government could be
maintained." Id. at 162.
124. Id. at 167-68.
125. 3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 447-448, available at http://memory.loc.gov/ll/lled/003/

0400/04590447.tif. Patrick Henry's views as to the meaning of the Eighth Amendment are
especially important given the Court's demonstration of Patrick Henry as the "paradigm for those
who favored adoption of the eighth amendment." See Millen, supra note 27, at 801.
126. ELLIOT, supra note 125, at 447-48 (emphasis added). It is interesting to note that Professor
Wigmore, who was long considered the "final authority" in discussing the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, has stated that although there was agitation then going on in

France against the inquisitorial feature[s] of French law in 1789, "[t]here appears no allusions, in
Elliott's Debates on the Constitution to the contemporary French movement but the delegates who
had been over there must have known about it." Pittman. supra note 38, at 764 (quoting IV
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2250). As the Patrick Henry quote makes clear, the Framers were aware
of the French practices. However, they discussed the relevance of these practices in terms of the
application of the Eighth Amendment.
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disregarded. 1 27 Mason, seeming to misunderstand the meaning of Nicholas'
response to Henry, assured him, expressing "his interpretation of the cruel
and unusual punishments clause."'' 28 Mason replied:
[T]he worthy gentleman was mistaken in his assertion that the bill
of rights did not prohibit torture; for that one clause expressly
provided that no man can give evidence against himself; and that
the worthy gentleman must know that, in those countries where
torture is used, evidence was extorted from the criminal himself.
Another clause of the bill of rights provided that no cruel and
unusual punishments shall29 be inflicted; therefore, torture was
included in the prohibition. 1
These statements provide some evidence of Mason's and Henry's view of
the protections provided by the provisions of the Fifth and Eighth
Amendments, as including protection from interrogation torture. 130 Given
that the language incorporated into the Eighth Amendment is so similar to
the language used in this discussion, it also provides some indication of what
informed participants in the debates would have understood the language of
the Eighth Amendment to encompass.
To ensure Virginia's ratification of the Constitution, a compromise was
reached by which Madison agreed to recommend the amendments sought by
Patrick Henry which were reasonable, if the Anti-federalists would vote to
support the constitution as it was.13 ' With this concession in place, Virginia
voted to approve the proposed constitution, without formal reservation.' 32
To determine which amendments Virginia would propose, a committee
was formed that included both Patrick Henry and George Mason. 13' Again,
Mason played a critical role in these proposed amendments. 134 Mason
inserted the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments into the
proposed amendments, which consisted of twenty articles. 135
Not
surprisingly, given his role in drafting Virginia's earlier Declaration of
Rights, fourteen of the twenty articles which
Mason drew up were taken
36
from the Virginia Declaration of Rights. 1

127.

ELLIOT, supra note 125, at 451.

128. Granucci, supra note 36, at 841.
129. ELLIOT, supra note 125, at 452.
130. See Jeffrey Bukowski, Comment, The Eighth Amendment and OriginalIntent: Applying the
ProhibitionAgainst Cruel and Unusual Punishments to Prison Deprivation Cases is Not Beyond the

Bounds of History and Precedent, 99 DICK. L. REV. 419, 422 n.19 (1994) (noting that according to
Granucci, "decapitation, the rack, or any other torturous means of extorting a confession were
among the methods of punishment that concerned those who supported the Eighth Amendment.").
131. RUTLAND, supra note 26, at 173. James Madison promised that he would "help secure any
amendments that would give satisfaction and were not harmful." BRANT, supra note 86, at 41.
132.
133.
134.

BRANT, supra note 86, at 41.
RUTLAND, supra note 26, at 174.
BRANT, supra note 86, at 41 ("George Mason itemized the guarantees to be asked for by

Virginia.").
135.

Id.

136. Id.
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When Congress met in the spring of 1789, Madison kept his word and
submitted his proposal for amendments to the House. "His proposals
covered all of the ten articles which eventually formed the federal Bill of
Rights," 137 including the Eighth Amendment originally drafted by Mason.
"In drafting the proposals, Madison had leaned heavily on the Virginia
Declaration of Rights....,,138 Thus it is not surprising that George Mason,
one of the principal authors of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, was
39
pleased with Madison's efforts.1
Very little was said concerning the meaning of the Eighth Amendment
40
during the Congressional debates. Indeed, there were only two comments.1
One comment noted that it was troublesome because it might prohibit certain
acceptable forms of punishment for crimes' 4' and the other that the meaning
of the amendment was so vague as to mean nothing. 42 However, the
congressional debates support the proposition that the Eighth Amendment's
reach is beyond criminal cases.
In these debates, a discussion of the reach of the Fifth Amendment
immediately precedes the discussion of the Eighth Amendment. Mr.
Lawrence believed that the self-incrimination clause "ought to be confined
to criminal cases, and moved an amendment for that purpose .... ,,14' The
4
clause was so amended and "unanimously agreed to by the committee."' 4
After this agreement, the committee "then proceeded to" consideration of the
Eighth Amendment. No proposals were suggested or adopted limiting the
application of the Eighth Amendment to criminal cases.14- As such, it does
not appear to be so limited.
In any event, the amendment was passed, with nothing said or done to
contradict the broad meaning of the language as previously articulated by
Mason and Henry.
D. What the Histor , Reveals
This recitation of the history and meaning of the Eighth Amendment
specifically and the Bill of Rights generally demonstrates the direct links

137.

RUTLAND, supra note 26, at 202.

138. Id.
139. Id. at 210 ("George Mason declared that he had received the news of the proposed
amendments with great satisfaction.").
140. 1 Annals of Cong. 782-783 (John Gales, ed. 1789). Mr. Smith and Mr. Livermore were the
only two to comment on the Eighth Amendment.
141. Id. (Mr. Livermore expressed concern about the limitation placed on the legislature by the
amendment.); see also PERRY, supra note 34, at 237; RUTLAND, supra note 26, at 208.

142.
import
143.
144.
145.

1 Annals of Cong. 782-783 (Joseph Gales, ed. 1789) (Mr. Smith expressed concern that its
was "too indefinite.").
Id. at 782: United States v. Gecas. 120 F.3d 1419, 1456 (1 lth Cir. 1997).
I Annals of Cong. 782 (Joseph Gales. ed. 1789).
Id.
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between concerns for interrogation torture and the belief that the Eighth
Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishments provided
some measure of protection against this form of oppressive conduct. When
originally expressed on this continent, the prohibition appears to have drawn
its life from concerns that included the use of torture in interrogation. 146 The

exact language is drawn from the English Bill of Rights, which was certainly
concerned with post-conviction punishments. However, the use of torture to
extract confessions was also a likely concern to the English drafters.
As noted, the English Bill of Rights, Article 10, was a reaction to the

ecclesiastical courts, which in the past had used torture to extract
confessions from those appearing before them. 147 Thus, it is likely that the
offensive conduct that provoked Article 10 included concerns about the
potential of these courts to use torture to extract confessions, not just that it
was concerned with extreme post-conviction punishments. 148 Tellingly, this

author could find nothing in the historical record in England which
conclusively limited the
intended application of this phrase to post149
conviction punishments.
Furthermore, although some commentators have concluded that when

this language was included in the English Bill of Rights of 1689, it was
primarily directed at post-conviction punishment, "it is clear that the
American Framers read into the phrase the meaning of Beale and Ward."'t 5501
That meaning included an intent to protect against torturous interrogation.

When considered by some of the principal actors in the adoption of the Bill
of Rights, it appears that those who called for protection of individual rights

146. See supra Part II(A).
147. Article 3 of the Bill of Rights of 1689 specifically prohibited the reinstitution of the
ecclesiastical courts. These courts had been outlawed previously, in 1641. In spite of this fact, in
1661, ecclesiastical jurisdiction was restored. In 1686, the Ecclesiastical Court, known as the High
Commission, was restored. James dissolved the High Commission in 1688 in an attempt to appease
opponents. However, its prohibition was nonetheless included in the Bill of Rights.
148. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 967-68 ("Most historians agree that the 'cruell and unusuall
Punishments' provision of the English Declaration of Rights was prompted by the abuses attributed
to the infamous Lord Chief Justice Jeffreys of the King's Bench during the Stuart reign of James
II....
They do not agree, however, on which abuses.").
149. On the contrary, the preamble to the Declaration of Rights plainly states that it was in
reaction to the "Prosecutions in the Courts of the Kings Bench for Matters and Causes cognizable
only in parliament; and by divers other arbitraryand illegal courses." Bill of Rights (1689),
reprinted in PERRY, supra note 34, at 245 (emphasis added). This language suggests that the source
of the drafters' concern was broader than simply post-conviction punishment. Rather, they were
concerned with the entire process engaged in by these courts. Nothing in the text of the document
illuminates to what the authors referred to with the phrase "divers other arbitrary and illegal
courses." Justice Scalia in his opinion in Harnelin says that this preamble "specifically referred to
illegal sentences." Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 969. This is simply not home out by the text of the
document itself, which no where refers to "sentences" of any kind, illegal or otherwise.
150. Granucci, supra note 36, at 860.
151. "From every indication, the Framers of the Eighth Amendment intended to give the phrase a
meaning far different from that of its English precursor. The records of the debates in several of the
state conventions called to ratify the 1789 draft Constitution submitted prior to the addition of the
Bill of Rights show that the Framers' exclusive concern was the absence of any ban on tortures. The
later inclusion of the 'cruel and unusual punishments' clause was in response to these objections."
Furman, 408 U.S. at 377 (Burger, J., dissenting).
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intended for the Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual
punishments to protect against torturous interrogation. 5 2 As Justice
Brennan has noted, when discussing the meaning of the Eighth Amendment,
"It is obvious that [Patrick] Henry was referring to the use of torture for the
purpose of eliciting confessions from suspected criminals.' 53 Thus, from a
historical perspective, there is support for the notion that the Eighth
Amendment was intended to cover such conduct by government.
Acceptance of this conclusion is also prudent given the policy
considerations that motivated the Framers to adopt the Eighth Amendment.
As has been recognized by the Court, at its core, the Amendment is about
human dignity. 5 4 The Framers were clearly concerned that government
might be "tempted to cruelty."'' 55 When the government was so tempted, the
Framers intended the protections of the Eighth Amendment to safeguard
citizens against such governmental cruelty. Given this, the question arises:
what would application of the Eighth Amendment mean for someone like
Jose Padilla or Oliverio Martinez? To answer these questions, we must
consider what has occurred in those cases and look to the meaning and
application of the phrase cruel and unusual punishment as used in the Eighth
Amendment.
111. MODERN INTERPRETATIONS OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND ITS
POSSIBLE APPLICATION TO THE CASES OF JOSE PADILLA AND OLIVERIO
MARTINEZ

Mr.
year. 5 6
branch.
Padilla,

Padilla has been detained incommunicado by the military for over a
This detention is the result of a deliberate decision by the executive
According to statements of the government in court documents, Mr.
labeled an enemy combatant, is being detained for the purpose of

152. See ELLIOT, supra note 125, at 447-448 (Patrick Henry Comments); id. at 451 (George
Mason Response) (1836).
153. Furman, 408 U.S. at 260 n.2 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Marshall echoed this
conclusion stating that from his review of the history of the amendment, "there is no doubt whatever
that in borrowing the language and in including it in the Eighth Amendment, our Founding Fathers
intended to outlaw torture and other cruel punishments." Furman, 408 U.S. at 319.
154. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99-100 (1958) ("The basic concept underlying the Eighth
Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man."); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)
("The Amendment embodies 'broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity,
and decency ...').
155. Furman, 408 U.S. at 267 (Brennan, J., concurring).
156. It bears noting that Mr. Padilla is not the only such "enemy combatant" being detained
incommunicado. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S.
Ct. 981 (2004). The focus here is on Jose Padilla's case because he is a United States citizen who
was arrested within the United States. However, in analyzing the propriety of such conduct, the
author will refer to the government's justifications for its actions when discussing other detainees.

interrogating him.' 57 For more than a year, he has seen no one but his
interrogators and those detaining him. Indeed it is the interrogation that the
government gives as reason for this complete isolation. 5 8 It asserts that
contact with his lawyer would inhibit the "trust" bond between the
interrogators and their subject.' 59
Given that interrogation has been used to justify the purpose, nature and
length of incommunicado detention, it seems that an amendment designed to
act as a limit on torturous governmental interrogation would be particularly
relevant. 60 The government, however, has stated that the executive has
enhanced authority to engage in such conduct during wartime.' 6' Though
this article is not intended to be a full exploration of the applicability of the
Eighth Amendment during wartime, there are a number of points, relating to
the origins and the application of the Amendment, that must be noted. The
first involves the English origins to the Amendment. The English Bill of
Rights, Article 10, whether a reaction to the Bloody Assize or the trial of
Titus Oates, was drafted in response to actions taken by the King of England
during a time of rebellion. 62 Thus, the Amendment's genesis arose out of
actions by the executive (the Crown) during wartime. 63 The second point is
that one of the seminal Eighth Amendment cases in American jurisprudence
held that a penalty that had been justified by and applied as the result of
wartime desertion, violated the Eighth Amendment.' 64 Nothing in the

157. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has stated that "Padilla 'will be held by the United
States government through the Department of Defense and be questioned."' Padilla, 233 F. Supp.
2d at 573. Through detaining accused enemy combatants, the government has also stated that it
hopes to deter others. See Eric Lichtblan, Bush Declares Student an Enemy Conbatant,N.Y. TIMES,
June 24, 2003, at A15.
158. "DIA's approach to interrogation is largely dependent upon creating an atmosphere of
dependency and trust between the subject and interrogator. Developing the kind of relationship of
trust and dependency necessary for effective interrogations is a process that can take a significant
amount of time." Jacoby Declaration, supranote 7, at 4.
159. Jacoby asserts that "[e]ven seemingly minor interruptions can have profound psychological
impacts on the delicate subject-interrogator relationship." Jacoby Declaration, supra note 7, at 5.
"Providing him access to counsel now would create expectations by Padilla that his ultimate release
may be obtained through an adversarial civil litigation process. This would break-probably
irreparably-the sense of dependency and trust that the interrogators are attempting to create." Id. at
8.
160. Because nothing is known of the conditions of confinement or the nature and extent of the
interrogation other than its length, we must confine our analysis to the fact that the detention is
incommunicado and has lasted over a year. However, given the recent decision by the Pentagon to
allow Mr. Padilla limited access to his lawyer, this analysis may change. See DOD News Release,
supra note 8. In any event, any true analysis of whether the Eighth Amendment has been violated by
the interrogation of Mr. Padilla must necessarily involve consideration of the realities of his
interrogation, which can only be accomplished if the government lifts the veil of secrecy that has
surrounded its actions in these cases.
161. See generally President Bush's Order Ito hold Padilla as an enemy combatant], June 9, 2002,
available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/padilla/padillabush60902det.pdf.
162. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 968.
163. There is some dispute as to whether the current "war on terrorism" is the equivalent of a
declared war. See Matt J. O'Laughlin, Comment, Exigent Circumstances: Circumscribing the
Exclusionary Rule in Response to 9/11, 70 UMKC L. REV. 707, 714 (2002).
164. Trop, 356 U.S. at 86.
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history of this Amendment limits its application to peace time. 65 As such,
its application to Mr. Padilla seems to be appropriate.
In contrast, Mr. Martinez's case involves injury that occurred during an
altercation with law enforcement and the subsequent interrogation conducted
by an individual officer, which occurred at a hospital treating him for his
injuries. 66 His interrogation lasted approximately ten minutes of his fortyfive minute treatment by doctors. 167 However, because his complaint
involved an allegation of coercive interrogation,168 an analysis of the
applicability of the Eighth Amendment seems warranted. 69 To thoroughly
analyze application of the Eighth Amendment to these two situations, we
must first examine the jurisprudence and then assess these cases in that light.
A. Torturous Interrogationand Punishment Under the Eighth Amendment
The most obvious question as to the applicability of the Eighth
Amendment to anything but post-conviction punishment centers on the
meaning of word "punishment" in that amendment. 70 To analyze this
question, one must consider two things. First, one must consider any
evidence that exists as to the intent of the Framers in including the word
punishment in the clause, including consideration of the definition and usage
of the word "punishment" in the time leading up to the adoption of the

165. In Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996), the Court was faced with a question of
whether a death sentence imposed as the result of a court martial required proof of aggravating
circumstances which established a higher culpability on the part of the offender. In analyzing this
question, the Court assumed that the Eighth Amendment was applicable to court martial
proceedings, citing Furman and its progeny. Id. at 755. The Court cited Trop as supporting this
assumption by analogy, though Justice Thomas, in his concurrence, expressed uncertainty about this
assumption. Id. at 755, 777. Padilla, of course, is not a member of the United States military who
faces court martial. He is a United States citizen facing indefinite detention and interrogation, based
upon his designation as an enemy combatant by the Executive. While some may question whether
the Eighth Amendment should be applied at all when the executive branch asserts it is acting
pursuant to its war power or whether the Eighth Amendment should be construed differently in such
instances, full exploration of those questions will be saved for another day. However, given the
history of the Amendment as a reaction to war time abuses by the executive, the authority noted
supra supporting application of the Amendment to military proceedings, and the absense of any
authority limiting the reach of this Amendment to cases such as Padilla's, the case for applying the
Eighth Amendment in this context is compelling. In light of these factors, the onus to refute such
application is placed squarely upon those who contend that the Eighth Amendment should not so
apply.
166. Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 1999.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 2000.
169. Application of the Eighth Amendment to the cases of Mr. Padilla and Mr. Martinez is
somewhat difficult in that the Court has never before applied the Eighth Amendment to
interrogations. Given this fact, this author will focus on the component parts of the amendment and
consider the principles underlying the tests articulated by the Court in other circumstances to guide
this analysis.
170. To break apart the amendment and consider the component parts is of only limited assistance
in understanding the meaning of the amendment as a whole.

683

Eighth Amendment. 7 ' Additionally, one must analyze the use of the term as
the Court has applied it, including its attempts to clarify the definition of this
word.
1. How the Court Has Interpreted the Word "Punishment."
Even though the Framers did not specify the exact meaning of the word
punishment, on occasion, the Court has attempted to define this one word in
the Eighth Amendment. The Court's interpretation of "punishment" has not
been limited to dictionary definitions of this term. Definitions cannot be the
ending point when construing a word in the constitution. Due attention must
be given to the intent of the Framers in adopting
that provision and its
72
relation to the other words in the document.
In any event, the plain meaning of the word punishment must be
addressed. Punishment is defined in the American Heritage Dictionary as
"1. a. An act of punishing. b. The condition of being punished. 2. A penalty
imposed for wrongdoing. 3. Informal. Rough handling; mistreatment.' 73
This definition is echoed in a number of other common dictionaries. For
example, the Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary defines punishment
as an "1: the act of punishing 2 a: suffering, pain, or loss that serves as
retribution b: a penalty inflicted on an offender through judicial procedure 3:
severe, rough or disastrous treatment."'' 74 The American Edition of the
Oxford Essential Dictionary defines it as "I. act or instance of punishing;
condition of being punished. 2 loss or suffering inflicted in this. 3 colloq.
severe treatment or suffering."'175 What each of these definitions reveals is
that the word, as used in the common vernacular, 76 encompasses two

171. Seesupra Part II.
172. See generally Eric J. Segall. A Century Lost. The End of the Originalism Debate, 15 CONST.
COMMENT 411 (1998); James A. Gardner, The Positivist Foundations of Originalism: An Account
and Critique, 71 B.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1991) ("the principal task of judges called upon to interpret the
Constitution is to ascertain and give effect to the original intentions of the [F]ramers and ratifiers.").
173. See also Thomas Landry, "Punishment" and the Eighth Amendment, 57 OHIO ST. L. J. 1607,
at 1609 n.I
I (citing THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1060
(1976)). While such definitions are of little help in determining the original intent of the Framers,
courts and commentators have cited to modem definitions for guidance in applying the Eighth
Amendment. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 1II
U.S. 825, 854 (1994) (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1843 (1961)). This reliance on modern definitions is perhaps

more appropriate when it comes to a constitutional provision such as the Eighth Amendment which
has been construed to evolve with the societal standards. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349
(1909).
174.

MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 945 (10th ed.). "Punish" is defined in this

dictionary as "to impose a penalty on for a fault, offense, or violation.., to inflict a penalty for the
commission of (an offense) in retribution or retaliation ...to deal with roughly or harshly ...to
inflict injury on." Id.
175. OXFORD ESSENTIAL DICTIONARY 485 (10th ed.). "Punish" is defined as to "cause [an
offender] to suffer for an offense... inflict a penalty for [an offense]... tax severely ... hurt, abuse,

or treat improperly."
176. Black's Law Dictionary seems to define the term punishment more narrowly, limiting its
application to a penalty "inflicted upon a person by the authority of the law and the judgment and
sentence of a court, for some crime or offense committed by him... BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1234 (6th ed. 1990). However, it does include a "deprivation of property or some right." Id. This
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distinct sets of conduct: that which is inflicted in response to an offense and
one that involves rough
or severe treatment, neither necessarily following
77
judicial procedure. 1
That the definition of punishment is broader than post-adjudication
penalties was recognized in the statements of Justice Blackmun, in his
concurrence in Farmer v. Brennan.'78 Objecting to the "unduly narrow
definition of punishment"'' 79 adopted by the Court, Justice Blackmun
referred to the common usage definition of punishment, noting that a
"prisoner may experience punishment when he suffers 'severe, rough, or
disastrous treatment."" 8
Given the limited benefit gleaned by looking to dictionaries or even
legal dictionaries in determining whether something qualifies as punishment
under the Eighth Amendment, the Court has considered a number of things
in making this determination. It considers the nature of the government
action in question and in analyzing this, has been driven by more than a
facial acceptance of the stated purpose of the act in question. For example,
in determining whether an act authorized by statute qualifies as punishment,
the Court will look to the actual nature of the act, rather than the label given
it.'
Additionally, the Court will look to its precedent in other areas, such as
those cases dealing with "the constitutional prohibitions against bills of
attainder and ex
post facto laws .. " to determine whether something is
82
"punishment."
An example of this arose in Trop v. Dulles.'83 In Trop, the Court
addressed the question raised by a statute that on its face appeared "to be a
regulation of nationality."' 1 4 In spite of this, the Court noted that the form of
the statute did not answer the question of whether it was actually penal in
nature. "In deciding whether or not a law is penal, [the] Court has generally
based its determination upon the purpose[s] of the statute."' 185 In answering
this question, the Court considers whether "the statute imposes a disability

narrow view of the definition of punishment is not surprising given the lack of real analysis of the

term in the court precedent.
177. The only exception to this is the third definition from Merriam-Webster's.

MERRIAM-

WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1009 (1 th ed. 2003).
178. 511 U.S. 825 (1994).

179. Id. at 855 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
180. Id. at 854 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1843 (1961)).

181. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 94 ("How simple would be the tasks of constitutional adjudication and
of law generally if specific problems could be solved by the inspection of the labels pasted on
them.").
182.

Id. at 95-96; see also infra Part III (A)(3)(a) (discussing the case of In re Medley, 134 U.S.

160 (1890)).
183. 356 U.S. 86.
184. Id. at 95. In Trop, the Court considered whether the punishment of denationalization as a
penalty for wartime desertion was a violation of the Eighth Amendment. See id. The Court, in a
plurality decision, held that itwas. Id.
185. Id. at 96.
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for the purposes of punishment-that is, [if the purpose] [is] to reprimand the
wrongdoer, to deter others, etc., it has been considered penal.

may have both penal and non-penal effects.'

87

186

A statute

"The controlling nature of

such statutes normally depends on the evident purpose of the legislature. 188
While informative, Trop did not definitively answer the question of

what is "punishment."

Trop requires the Court to look at the purposes

behind the governmental action. 189 "[Elven a clear legislative classification

of a statute as 'non-penal' would not alter the fundamental nature of a
plainly penal statute."' 90 This analysis is to be done by considering the
traditional goals of punishment. The more a governmental action furthers

those goals, the more likely it is to be considered punishment for purposes of
the Eighth Amendment.' 9' In determining the nature of governmental
action, the Court has "always accepted deterrence in general, deterrence of
individual recidivism, isolation of dangerous persons, and rehabilitation as
proper goals of punishment."' 92 Thus, the193universally accepted goals of
punishment include deterrence and isolation.
2. Ingraham v. Wright
Any discussion of the Court's interpretation of punishment under the
Eighth Amendment would be incomplete without addressing the holding in
Ingraham v. Wright.' 94 In Ingraham, the Court analyzed the application of
95
the Eighth Amendment to the discipline of a student in the school setting.
It held that the Eighth Amendment did not apply to such a setting. 96 This
case has been cited as the basis for the seemingly universal assumption that

186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. In Trop, the examples given by the Court to demonstrate these principles were loss of
right to liberty and to vote. Id. In analyzing these, the Court reasoned that "because the purpose of
the latter statute is to designate a reasonable ground of eligibility, this law is sustained as a nonpenal
exercise of the power to regulate the franchise." Id. at 96-97. In reaching this conclusion, the Court
noted that "[o]f course, the severity of the disability imposed as well as all the circumstances
surrounding the legislative enactment is relevant to this decision." Id. at 96 n. 18.
189. See also Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 196 (1898) (analyzing whether something
qualified as punishment under the ex post facto clause, and noting that the court looks "at the
substance and not the form..." of a particular statute).
190. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 686 (1977) (White, J., dissenting) (citing Trop, 356 U.S.
at 95).
191. "The relevant inquiry is not whether the offense for which [the] punishment is inflicted has
been labeled criminal, but whether the purpose of the deprivation is among those ordinarily
associated with punishment, such as retribution, rehabilitation, or deterrence." Ingraham, 430 U.S.
at 686-87.
192. Furman, 408 U.S. at 343.
193. See also Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737 n.5 (2002) (concluding that the actions of the
executive qualified as punishment, the Court stated, -[i]t is more likely that the guards left Hope on
the post until his work detail returned to teach the other inmates a lesson").
194. 430U.S. 651 (1977).
195. Id.
196. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 651.
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the Eighth Amendment is inapplicable absent a criminal conviction. 97 The
implication is that something is "punishment" under the Eighth Amendment
only if it occurs after a criminal process.' 98 This reading of Ingraham is
incorrect, for it is broader than the Court's analysis or holding. To the extent
that this is an accurate assessment of the Ingraham decision, the decision is
erroneous. In any event, Ingraham is uninstructive as to the parameters of
what constitutes punishment under the Eighth Amendment aside from
criminal convictions.
The Ingraham Court was faced with determining "whether the paddling
of students as a means of maintaining school discipline constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment."' 99 To answer
this question, the Court looked at the "well known" 2° ° history of the Eighth
Amendment, the types of cases in which it had previously applied the
Amendment, and the differences between the settings in which the allegedly
offensive acts took place.2°'
In addressing the history, the Court reiterated the link to the English Bill
of Rights of 1689.202 The Court noted that the language limiting this
protection to "criminal cases" was eliminated from the final version of the
English Bill of Rights' proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.2 3
The Court then asserted that such deletion was "without substantive
significance." 204 To support this interpretation of the English Bill of Rights,
the Court noted that the preamble to this document still makes reference to
criminal cases.20 5 However, that reference is in relation to excessive bailnotably, not the punishment's clause.20 6

197. See Graham v. Connor. 490 U.S. 386, 398 n.6 (1989): ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY
TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT. RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE 135, 247 n.5

(Yale U. Press 2002); see also Chanterelle Sung, Torturing the Ticking Bomb Terrorist: An Analysis
of Judicially Sanctioned Torture in the Context of Terrorism. 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 193. 197-

98 (2003) (book review) ("Moreover, Dershowitz notes that the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against, 'cruel and unusual punishment' does not apply in this situation because the ticking bomb
terrorist has not yet been convicted.").
198. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 651.
199. Id. at 653.
200. Though the history is "well known," that history's meaning has been debated by historians,
legal scholars and the bench since the Court began considering it.
201. See generallv Ingraham. 430 U.S. at 651.
202. Id. at 664-66.
203. Id. at 665.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 665 n.33. As the Court stated,
[tlhe preamble reads in part: 'WHEREAS the late King James the Second. by the
assistance of divers evil counsellors, judges, and ministers employed by him, did
endeavor to subvert and extirpate ... the laws and liberties of this Kingdom ....
10. And
excessive bail hath been required of persons committed in criminal cases, to elude the
benefit of the laws made for the liberty of the subjects. I1. And excessive fines have
been imposed; and illegal and cruel punishments inflicted
."
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The Ingraham Court then considered the intent of the Framers in

including the cruel and unusual punishment clause. Focusing on who the
clause was intended to limit, the Court stated that "the principal concern of

the American Framers appears to have been with the legislative definition of
crimes and punishments.

' 20 7

The historical record appears to support this

assertion. However, implicit in the Court's recognition that this was the
Framers' principal concern is the acknowledgment that it was not their sole
concern.
Additionally, the Court overstated the import of the statement made
during the First Congress on the Eighth Amendment that expressed concern

about limiting the authority of the legislature to determine what punishments
would apply to crime. 8 Furthermore, the Court ignored the history of this
proscription in the colonies, which was broader than that described.20 9 In
any event, the Court in no way suggested that even if the "principal concern"

of the Framers was legislatively enacted punishments, that they were not
also concerned with punishments inflicted at the direction of the executive or
judicial branch.210 In fact, the Eighth Amendment has been recognized to
have been intended to act as a check on all branches of government. 21' To
assert that the Framers would have permitted cruel and unusual punishment
so long as done by the Executive instead of the legislature, strains
credulity.212
The Court then noted that during the ratification process, the

Constitution had been criticized for failing to "provide protection for persons
convicted of crimes, 213 suggesting that this limited the Eighth
Amendment's application to those convicted of crimes. To support this
suggestion, the Court referred to comments made during the Massachusetts
and Virginia Conventions. 214 It is instructive to understand the context of

Id. (quoting R. PERRY & J. COOPER, SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 245-46 (1959)).
Certainly the fact that it was specifically included in one clause would suggest the drafters of this
document did not intend to so limit the other in which it was not included. A similar conclusion is
suggested by the fact that when discussing the Fifth and Eighth Amendments in the First Congress,
the choice was made to specifically limit the Fifth Amendment to criminal cases and not to so limit
the Eighth. I Annals of Cong. 782 (Joseph Gales, ed. 1789).
207. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 665.
208. Mr. Livermore, noting the "humanity" of the clause, expressed concern that the clause might
limit the authority of the legislature to do such things as hang a man. I Annals of Cong. 783 (Joseph
Gales, ed. 1789). However, as the Ingraham Court noted, this concern was "not heeded."
Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 666. Nothing in the Livermore discussion limits the application of the Eighth
Amendment to the actions of the legislature.
209. See supra Part II.
210. As Justice Scalia pointed out in Harmelin, the drafters of the Bill of Rights of 1698 were
concerned with the actions of the Crown. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 974 (1991).
211. See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 397 (1910) (White, J., dissenting).
212. It is true that the Framers seemed very concerned about the expansive nature of legislative
power. However, that is because they viewed it as the more powerful branch vis-A-vis the executive
branch.
213. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 666.
214. Id.
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the short quotes included by the Court in analyzing the protections intended
by the Framers to be covered by this amendment.
The Court is correct that in the Massachusetts Convention, Abraham
Holmes did indeed complain of a Congress with the unchecked power to
invent "the most cruel and unheard-of punishments, and annexing them to

crimes."'2 15 However, he did this after expressing concern for a "Congress
possessed of powers enabling them to institute judicatories little less

inauspicious than a certain tribunal in Spain, which has long been the
disgrace of Christendom: I mean the diabolical institution, the
Inquisition.' ' 216 It bears noting that the Inquisition was one of the most
disgraceful periods for Christendom precisely due to practices such as the

use of torture to elicit information from the accused.217
The Court also quoted from Patrick Henry's opposition

to the

Constitution in the Virginia ratification debates.21 8 Again, the Court did not
include the entire quotation.219 Instead, it focused on the portion of his
statement expressing concern about the extensive power of Congress relating
to the definition of crimes. 220 Left off was the portion of the debates wherein
Patrick Henry specifically linked the cruel and unusual punishment clause to
his concerns about the power to extort confessions. 22
Patrick Henry's
comment was followed shortly by that of George Mason, who confirmed
Henry's understanding that the Eighth Amendment would prohibit torturous
interrogation conduct.222

215. ELLIOT, supra note 125, at I11.
216. Id.
217. See Nancy Amoury Combs, Copping a Plea to Genocide: The Plea Bargaining of
International Crimes, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 30 n.108 (noting that the "term 'inquisitorial' has,
particularly in the past, 'conjure[d] up the excesses of the Star Chamber or the haunting memories of
the Spanish Inquisition') (quoting G.E.P. Brouwer, Inquisitional and Adversary Procedures - A
ComparativeAnalysis, 55 AUSTRALIAN L.J. 207, 208 (1981)).
218. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 666 n.35.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Henry stated:
In the business of legislation, your members of Congress will loose the restriction of not
imposing excessive fines, demanding excessive bail, and inflicting cruel and unusual
punishments. These are prohibited by your declaration of rights. What has distinguished
our ancestors?-That they would not admit of tortures, or cruel and barbarous
punishments. But Congress may introduce the practice of the civil law, in preference to
that of the common law. They may introduce the practice of France, Spain, and
Germany-of torturing, to extort a confession of the crime. They will say that they might
as well draw examples from those countries as from Great Britain, and they will tell you
that there is such a necessity of strengthening the arm of government, that they must have
a criminal equity, and extort confession by torture, in order to punish with still more
relentless severity. We are then lost and undone.
ELLIOT, supra note 125, at 447-48.
222. Mason replied that:
[Tjhe worthy gentleman was mistaken in his assertion that the bill of rights did not
prohibit torture; for that one clause expressly provided that no man can give evidence
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This historical record, while truly not supporting application of the
Amendment to the discipline of school children, at issue in Ingraham, in no
way suggests the proposition for which it has been cited, namely that
punishment under the Eighth Amendment can only occur after a criminal
conviction is entered.
The Court noted that in every case in which it found the Eighth
Amendment applicable, the case "dealt with a criminal punishment. '223 The
Court then asserted that in those cases involving a claim "that impositions
outside the criminal process constituted cruel and unusual punishment, it has
had no difficulty finding the Eighth Amendment inapplicable. 224 The Court
primarily focused on the cases of Fong Yue Ting v. United States225 and
Uphaus v. Wyman, 2 2 to support its limitation of the Eighth Amendment to
post-conviction punishments. 227 Neither of these cases, however, provide the
unequivocal support for the proposition stated by the Court.2 2 8
229
In Fong Yue Ting, the Court was faced with a Due Process challenge
to the arrest and deportation of Chinese Nationals for failing to have
"certificates of residence. '230 Contrary to the Court's assertion in Ingraham,
it did not hold the Eighth Amendment inapplicable to aliens in
deportation.2 31
Rather, it stated in dicta, and without any substantive
analysis of the Eighth Amendment question, that a proceeding under the
statute at issue was "simply the ascertainment, by appropriate and lawful
means, of the fact whether the conditions exist upon which congress has
enacted that an alien of this class may remain within the country. '232 Based
on the Fong Yue Ting Court's conclusion that the order of deportation was
not the equivalent of a punishment for a crime, the Court stated that the

against himself; and that the worthy gentleman must know that, in those countries where
torture is used, evidence was extorted from the criminal himself. Another clause of the
bill of rights provided that no cruel and unusual punishments shall be inflicted: therefore,
torture was included in the prohibition.
Id. at 452.
223. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 666. This statement is later controverted in this very opinion at note
37 wherein the Court admitted that "[s]ome punishments, though not labeled 'criminal' ... , may be
sufficiently analogous to criminal punishments in the circumstances in which they were administered
to justify application of the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 669 n.37.
224. Id. at 667-68.
225. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
226. 360 U.S. 72 (1959).
227. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 668.

228. The Court also cited, without discussion, to the cases of Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924)
and Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585 (1913). These cases are equally uninstructive on the exact
parameters of what constitutes punishment under the Eighth Amendment. In Mahler, the Court
quickly dismissed any comparison between a deportation order and a criminal conviction, stating
that Fong Yue Ting had answered the question of whether a deportation was a punishment. Mahler,
264 U.S. at 39. Similarly in Bugajewitz, the Court stated without any discussion that a deportation is
neither a conviction for crime nor punishment. Bugajewitz, 228 U.S. at 591.
229. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 703.

230. Id. at 699 (statement of Facts by Mr. Justice Gray). Certificates of residence were required
under section 6 of the act of May 5, 1892, c. 60. Id.
231. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 668.
232. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 730.
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constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment has "no
23 3
application," and denied the due process claim.
Uphaus provides an even thinner reed for the Court to have relied upon
in Ingraham.234 In Uphaus, the Court analyzed in depth the "sole question"
before it: whether a contempt order issued by the New Hampshire state court
for production of certain documents was valid. 235 Though it is true as the
Court asserted, that the appellant raised a claim that his indefinite sentence
for contempt would constitute "cruel and unusual punishment as to be a
denial of due process. '23 6 This claim was raised for the first time on appeal
and is summarily analyzed and dismissed without any reference to the
Eighth Amendment whatsoever.237 Instead, in rejecting the claim, the Court
quoted from the dissent of a case, Green v. United States,238 dealing with a
summary contempt.2 39 The Green case was cited for the proposition that
because the "defendant carries the keys to freedom in his willingness to
comply with the court's directive 2 40 imprisonment of the contemptor was a
valid civil remedy, and therefore presumably not a violation of the Eighth
24
Amendment. '
Neither of these cases provides the definitive answer of whether the
Eighth Amendment applies outside of the instances wherein a criminal
conviction has been secured.
Finally, the Ingraham Court addressed the appellants' contention that
given the compulsory nature of schooling in the United States, the Eighth
Amendment should be "extended to ban the paddling of schoolchildren. 242
In rejecting this claim, the Court compared the circumstances faced by
prisoners and schoolchildren. 43 It noted that a prisoner's conviction entitles
the state to classify the person a "criminal," and to incarcerate him and
deprive him of his "freedom 'to be with his family and friends and to form
the other enduring attachments of normal life. '' 244 In contrast, the Court
placed particular emphasis on its observation that a public school is an "open
institution. 245 In explaining why the Eighth Amendment does not extend to
schools, the Court noted:

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Id.
See generally Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959).
Uphaus, 360 U.S. at 75-76.
Id. at 76.
Id. at 81-82.
356 U.S. 165 (1958).
Uphaus, 360 U.S. at 81.
Id. at 81.
Id. at 81-82.
Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 668.
Id. at 669-70.
Id. at 669 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)).
Id. at 670.

The child is not physically restrained from leaving school during
school hours; and at the end of the school day, the child is
invariably free to return home. Even while at school, the child
brings with him the support of family and friends and is rarely apart
from teachers and other pupils who may witness and protest any
instances of mistreatment.24
The openness of the public school and its supervision by the
community afford significant safeguards against the kinds
of abuses
2 47
from which the Eighth Amendment protects the prisoner.
In sum, the Court in Ingraham did not define the parameters of the
248
application of the term punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
Instead, the Court addressed the narrow question before it, that being, does
the Eighth Amendment apply to the paddling of school children. 249 Its
discussion in Ingraham does little to illuminate, and certainly does not
conclusively answer the question concerning the extent to which the Eighth
Amendment applies absent a criminal conviction. 210 Neither its analysis nor
holding forecloses the Eighth Amendment's application to torturous
interrogation.2 1 l Therefore, consistent with the history and meaning of the
Amendment, it should be used to analyze allegations of torturous
interrogations.
This discussion of the Court's interpretations of the meaning of
"punishment," demonstrates that there is no clearly defined test for
determining whether particular actions by the government are punishments
or not. 2 To answer this question, the Court seems to focus on two things.
First, the Court considers the nature of the action involved to determine
whether it is by its nature "punishment. 253 Second, the Court considers the
purposes behind the government's action to see if it is motivated by goals
commonly associated with punishment.5
This author will use this
2 55
framework to analyze the cases involving Mr. Padilla and Mr. Martinez.

246. Id. at 666.
247. Id. at 670. Comparing the nature of the detention of enemy combatants with the
imprisonment of those convicted of criminal offenses would likely reach a different conclusion than
that reached in comparing school children to convicted prisoners. According to the government, the
designation of someone as an enemy combatant entitles the government to detain him for as long as
it wishes, and to deny the person classified as an enemy combatant access to anyone and under
conditions subject to no oversight.
248. See generally Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 651.
249. Id. at 665-66.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 660.
254. Id. at 667.
255. As noted above, no court has applied the Eighth Amendment to interrogations. Thus, the
specific tests identified and applied by the Court in other circumstances do not fully answer the
question of how the Court would analyze these cases. As such, this author will focus the concepts
underlying the amendment and will discuss their possible applicability to and impact on the analysis.
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3. Has Punishment Been Inflicted on Mr. Padilla or Mr. Martinez?

a. Is the Incommunicado Detention of Jose Padillafor Interrogation
Punishmentby Its Nature?
Though segregated confinement alone has been uniformly held not to be
256
a violation of the Eighth Amendment absent some other aggravating fact,
the Court has stated that "[c]onfinement in a prison or in an isolation cell is a
form of punishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth Amendment
standards. 257 This conclusion is supported by the Supreme Court case of In
re Medley.258
Medley analyzed whether a legislative change which added solitary
confinement for a prisoner condemned to death for an offense that occurred
before this change amounted to an ex post facto violation.259 In concluding
that it did, the Court analyzed the nature of solitary confinement to
determine whether it was punishment by its nature. 260 Tracing the history of
solitary confinement and its fall from favor, the Court concluded that the
solitary confinement at issue "was
an additional punishment of the most
2 61
important and painful character.
In analyzing whether Mr. Padilla's incommunicado detention qualifies
as punishment, the differences between his detention and that of James
Medley are important. James Medley was allowed access to "his attendants,
counsel, physician, a spiritual adviser of his own selection, and members of
his family ...in accordance with prison regulations. ' 2 62 In Mr. Padilla's
case, to date, he has been allowed access to no one aside from his
interrogators and military detention personnel.2 63 Even with this heightened

256. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D.
Cal. 1995).
257. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 685.
258. 134 U.S. 160(1890).
259. Id. at 162-63. As noted above, in Trop, the Court looked to cases involving "bills of
attainder and ex post facto" violations for guidance on how to determine whether something
qualifies as "punishment." Trop, 356 U.S. at 95-96.
260. Medley, 134 U.S. at 167-68.
261. Id. at 171.
262. Id. at 164.
263. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THREAT OF A BAD EXAMPLE:
UNDERMINING

INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS

AS "WAR

ON TERROR"

available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR511142003

DETENTIONS

CONTINUE,

(last visited Feb. 2, 2004).

As noted above, the Pentagon has now agreed to permit limited access to Mr. Padilla by his lawyers.
DOD News Release supra note 8. These limitations will likely mirror those imposed on Yaser Esam
Hamdi and his lawyers, which include limitations on both the form of the access, in that it is
monitored and recorded, and the content of the access, in that no conversation about the condition of
his confinement or the methods of interrogation is permitted. See Toni Locy, Accused combatant
allowed to see lawyers, USA TODAY, February 4, 2004, available at 2004 WL 58550731; All Things
Considered,Analysis: US Citizen Yaser Esam Hamdi Allowed to Meet with His Lawyers for the first
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accessibility to others, the Medley Court found the isolated confinement a
"punishment."2 64
In Medley, the Court described a legislative experiment in solitary
confinement that involved "complete isolation of the prisoner from all
human society, and his confinement in a cell of considerable size, so
arranged that he had no direct intercourse with or sight of any human being,
and no employment or instruction. 2 65 Noting that such solitary confinement
had been found "too severe" and had fallen out2 of
use, the Court described
66
the consequences of this forced isolation system.
A considerable number of the prisoners fell, after even a short
confinement, into a semi-fatuous condition, from which it was next
to impossible to arouse them, and others became violently insane;
others, still, committed suicide; while those who stood the ordeal
better were not generally reformed, and in most cases did not
recover sufficient mental activity to be of any subsequent service to
the community.267
Thus, this confinement would amount to severe treatment which causes
disastrous results. In Mr. Padilla's case, it is unknown how much contact he
has with anyone, and the exact conditions of his confinement. However,
what is known is that the executive is holding him pursuant to its policy to
implement incommunicado detention, denying him access to lawyer, family
268
or friend. It, therefore, qualifies as "punishment.
b. Is the Government Motivated by Goals Commonly Associated With
Punishmentin DetainingMr. PadillaIncommunicadofor
Interrogation?
The reasons for Mr. Padilla's confinement must be analyzed to
determine if the government's actions qualify as punishment. In pleadings
to the Court, the government has stated that this type of isolated detention is
necessary to facilitate the interrogation. It would be remarkable if such a
justification would override the unmistakable character of this detention as
punishment. 269 Given that the Court has recognized isolation as a goal of
punishment, 270 the isolated detention qualifies as punishment.

time since being put into US custody more than two Years ago (NPR radio broadcast, February 3,
2004), available at 2004 WL 57376475.

264. Medley, 134 U.S. at 169.
265. Id. at 168.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Isolation was also used in England under the High Commission Court to extract information.
Under the High Commission established by Whitgift. if witnesses were not forthcoming with
information. "the clause, all other ways and means you can devise" enabled the Commission to
"make use of the rack, 'little ease,' ... and the solitary dungeon." JAMES HERON, A SHORT
HISTORY OF PURITANISM 131 (T. and T. Clark 1908).

269. To put it another way, it would be akin to saying that the ends justify the means. Merely
because torture produces statements does not mean that it is constitutionally permissible. "The
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It has been reported that the government spokesperson when announcing
the designation of another man as enemy combatant told reporters the
decision to drop the criminal charges and designate the man as an enemy
combatant was done "in an effort to deter terrorist attacks. 271
Thus,
deterrence appears to be factoring into the decision to detain enemy
combatants. z72
Deterrence has always been considered a function of
punishment. 273 Thus, it appears that even by the government's own
statements, Mr. Padilla's detention qualifies as punishment.
c. Was the Interrogationof Mr. Martinez While Being Treatedfor
Injuries Punishment by Its Nature?
Mr. Martinez's case does not involve detention, rather it involves
2 74
interrogation after being shot by officers and during medical treatment.
There is little doubt that Mr. Martinez was in pain during this interrogation.
275
He is reported to have said things like, "I am dying," and "I am choking.,
Continuing to interrogate someone who is experiencing such pain could
easily be described as severe treatment. Justice Stevens seems to agree with
this assessment. In his dissent, he characterized this interrogation as
torturous.276 Thus, by its nature it appears to be punishment.
d. Was the Government Motivated by Goals Commonly Associated With
Punishment in QuestioningMartinez During Medical Treatment?
The Court's decision does not indicate what motivated the government
to engage in this interrogation. It is difficult to see how such interrogation
could further the goals of deterrence, isolation, and rehabilitation. If it was
done for punitive reasons, however, it might qualify as punishment. Given

dominant theme of the Eighth Amendment debates was that the ends of the criminal laws cannot
justify the use of measures of extreme cruelty to achieve them." Furman, 408 U.S. at 392 (Burger,
C. J., dissenting).
270. Id. at 343.
271. Susan Schmitt. Qatari Man DesignatedAn Enemy Combatant, WASH. POST, June 24, 2003,
at A01, available at 2003 WL 56501204. The author attempted to get tapes of this announcement
exchange from both the government and reporters present at the time. She was told that the
government did not permit taping of this announcement.
272. There have also been reports that in criminal cases brought in the war on terrorism, the
government has "implicitly threatened" the use of the designation of someone as an enemy
combatant in order to secure guilty pleas. See Michael Powell, No Choice but Guilty; Lackawanna
Case HighlightsLegal Tilt, WASH. POST, July 29, 2003, at A01, available at 2003 WL 56509164.
273. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 95.
274. The act of being shot is certainly "severe, rough or disastrous." See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 854
(Blackmun, J.,concurring). Indeed, in Mr. Martinez's case, it led to his blinding and paralysis.
Chavez, 123 S.Ct. at 1999.
275. Chavez, 123 S.Ct. at 1999.
276. Id. at 2010 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

the limited information available, it is difficult to meaningfully assess
whether this prong has been met.
e. Conclusion on the Punishment Question
In Mr. Padilla's case, it seems clear that the interrogation qualifies as
punishment, as contemplated by the Framers in adopting the Eighth
Amendment, as both the nature of the action and the purpose behind it
suggest it qualifies as punishment. It is less clear in the case of Mr.
While his interrogation seems by its nature to qualify as
Martinez.
punishment, the purpose behind it is not clear. The next question is whether,
even if punishment, the actions of the government in these cases were cruel
and unusual as required by the Eighth Amendment.
B. The Term "Cruel and Unusual" as It Relates to Torturous Interrogation
Under the Eighth Amendment.
The notion of what punishments are "cruel and unusual" within the
meaning of the Eighth Amendment has been the subject of much discussion
by jurists and scholars. 77 However, there is no greater clarity as to the exact
parameters of the limitation placed on the term "punishment" by the
modifiers "cruel and unusual," than there is on what constitutes
punishment.2 78 As the Court stated in Trop, "[tlhe exact scope of the
constitutional
phrase 'cruel and unusual' has not been detailed by this
9
27

Court.

There has been considerable disagreement concerning the meaning of
this phrase. The debate seems to center on two questions. First, there is the
question of whether the phrase is backward looking, i.e., does it only
proscribe those things which were considered "cruel and unusual" by the
Framers, or is it forward looking, using as a litmus test the mores of
contemporary society. Second, the debate looks at what it means to be both
"cruel" and "unusual" as those words are used in the amendment.28 °

277. See, e.g., Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 979-85 (discussion of Justice Scalia).
278. In many cases, the Court does not specifically identify on which part of the clause it bases its
analysis. Rather, the Court simply talks of the clause as a whole. Though not stated, the cases do
suggest an emphasis on whether something is "cruel and unusual" and whether something qualifies
as punishment in itself.
279. Trop, 356 U.S. at 99. Although Trop was decided in 1958, the intervening years have done
little to clarify the scope of these words.
280. A great deal of scholarship and discussion in judicial opinions considers the question of
proportionality, i.e. whether the punishment is proportional to the offense committed. See, e.g.,
Harmelin, 501 U.S. 957; Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S. Ct. 1166 (2003). However, this debate is only
relevant to this discussion to the extent that it illuminates the answers to the primary questions of
what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.
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The first question seems to have been resolved.28' In determining
whether something is considered a violation of the "cruel and unusual"
provisions of the Eighth Amendment, the Court has held that the clause is
forward looking, not frozen in the Eighteenth century.282 To answer whether
something is cruel and unusual, the Court will consider the "evolving
28 3
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.
Though the oft repeated phrase "evolving standards of decency" was first
penned in the case of Trop 284 the concept which it captured was first
articulated by the Court much earlier, in Weems v. United States.285 Weems,
a "venerable" case in Eighth Amendment history, marked the turning point
in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence on this issue.286
Before Weems, the Court generally looked backward to determine what
constituted cruel and unusual punishment, limiting its application to only
those punishments which were considered sufficiently barbarous at the time
of the adoption of the Amendment to warrant prohibition. 287 The Weems
Court eliminated this constraint on the Amendment.288 Additionally, the
Weems Court "rejected the concept of a precise substantive scope [to the
Amendment] because the adopters' understanding was itself too
indeterminate. ' 289 To demonstrate the indeterminate nature of the phrase,
the Court discussed the competing concerns raised by the Framers of the
Constitution in debating the Bill of Rights. 290 The Court identified the
competing views of Mr. Wilson expressed in the Pennsylvania debates on
the ratification of the Constitution, and those of Patrick Henry in the
Virginia debates.2 9' As the Court noted, "Wilson, and those who thought
like Wilson, felt sure that the spirit of liberty could be trusted. 292 Thus, they
did not believe a bill of rights was necessary and it might even present a

281. Though this issue appears to have been resolved, that resolution may be short lived given
statements of Justices Scalia and Thomas in such cases as Helling, wherein they suggest that the
only relevant inquiry in Eighth Amendment analysis is the specific meaning of each word as defined
in legal dictionaries of the time of the enactment. Helling v McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 37-42 (1993)
(Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
282. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1909).
283. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101 ("The words of the Amendment are not precise, and ...their scope is
not static. The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society.").
284. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
285. 217U.S. 349(1910).
286. See Millen, supra note 27, at 789 (stating that Weems allowed courts "to decide what is 'cruel
and unusual,' as the eighth amendment's adopters intended, without the scope of review being bound
by narrow historical constraints").
287. See, e.g., Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
288. Weems, 217 U.S. at 373.
289. Millen, supra note 27, at 800.
290. Id.
291. Weems. 217 U.S. at 372.
292. Id.

697

problem in that it might suggest that the listed rights were the only rights
protected.293 In contrast, Patrick Henry was the chief spokesman for many
whose "predominant political impulse was distrust 29of
power, and they
4
insisted on constitutional limitations against its abuse.,
Ultimately, "[t]he Court considered Patrick Henry the paradigm for
those who favored adoption of the eighth amendment., 295 Given that the
Bill of Rights was adopted over the objections of those who held Wilson's
view, the Court resolved that it was the belief that "power might be tempted
to cruelty," which was the controlling sentiment in adopting the Eighth
Amendment.296 The Court noted:
[I]f we are to attribute an intelligent providence to its advocates we
cannot think that it was intended to prohibit only practices like the
Stuarts', or to prevent only an exact repitition of history. We cannot
think that the possibility of a coercive cruelty being exercised
through other forms of punishment was overlooked. We say

'coercive cruelty,' because there was more to be considered

than the ordinary criminal laws. Cruelty might become an
instrument of tyranny; of zeal for a purpose, either honest or
sinister z97
Noting that for a principle to be vital, it "must be capable of wider
application than the mischief which gave it birth, ' 298 the Court concluded
that the sentence imposed in Weems violated the Eighth Amendment.299
Since Weems, courts and scholars have struggled to determine the
appropriate test to be applied in assessing whether something violates the
evolving standards of decency embedded in the Eighth Amendment.3 °°
Though the "words of the Amendment are not precise" and the "scope is not
static," the Court has repeatedly stated that the "basic concept underlying the
In
Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man."3 0 '

293. See Millen, supra note 27, at 801.
294. Weems, 217 U.S. at 372.
295. Millen, supra note 27, at 801.
296. Weems, 217 U.S. at 373.
297. Id. at 373 (emphasis added).
298. Id.
299. Id. The sentence at issue was one of cardena temporal, imposed under the Philippine Code.
The Court in Weems was actually construing a provision of the Philippine Bill of Rights forbidding
the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. This provision was found to have been taken from
the U.S. Constitution and had the same meaning. Weems, 217 U.S. at 367.
300. For example, in Furman, Justice Powell, writing in dissent pointed out that 'cruel and
unusual punishments' and 'due process of law' are not "static concepts whose meaning and scope
were sealed at the time of their writing. They were designed to be dynamic and to gain meaning
through application to specific circumstances, many of which were not contemplated by their
authors." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 420 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting).
301. Trop, 356 U.S. at 100; see also Furman, 408 U.S. at 245, 281 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) ("But
the Eighth Amendment is our insulation from our baser selves. The 'cruel and unusual' language
limits the avenues through which vengeance can be channeled. Were this not so, the language would
be empty and the return to the rack and other tortures would be possible in a given case.") ("The
primary principle, which I believe supplies the essential predicate for the application of the others, is
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considering how the evolving standards of decency protect human dignity,
the Court will look to the context of each situation to determine whether the
clause has been violated.3 °2
Given the contextual nature of the phrase, the Court has identified
different tests to determine whether a particular punishment is cruel and
unusual. For example, when the Court is analyzing the provisions of a
sentencing statute, the test is objective, considering whether the terms of the
punishment are cruel and unusual in light of the evolving standards of
decency.30 3 In such cases, the Court does not require a3 showing
of
°4
subjective intent on the part of the legislature to cause the harm.
In cases involving allegations of misconduct by prison officials, the
Court has identified different tests, based on the alleged harm involved. In
these cases, the offending branch of government is different. Rather than
complaining about the actions of the legislature, the administration of
prisons falls under the executive branch.30 5
Additionally, often the
complaint is not with a regulation or a statute per se, but rather with the
actions of prison administrators that may or may not comply with
administrative regulations. 0 6
To address these contextual differences, "the Court has divided such
post-confinement challenges into three broad categories: (1) isolated
instances of mistreatment; (2) conditions of confinement; and (3) instances
of ill-treatment during emergency situations. ' 307 For each of these instances,
the Court has established different tests to 30determine
whether the actions of
8
the officials qualify as "cruel and unusual.
In conditions of confinement cases, the Court focuses on whether the
condition resulted in the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.,, 30 9 To
determine whether this has occurred, the Court applies a two-pronged
analysis." 0 First, the Court considers the objective component of an Eighth
Amendment claim. This involves a determination of whether a particular

that a punishment must not by its severity by degrading to human dignity.").
302. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992).
303. See, e.g., Weems. 217 U.S. at 349.
304. See id.
305. The application of this amendment to the actions of the executive branch harkens back to its
English origins which were directed at the actions of the English quasi-equivalent of the executive,
the King. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 974 (noting that the focus was on punishments inflicted "by the
Crown (or the Crown's judges).").
306. As noted in Furman, "[jiudicial findings of impermissible cruelty have been limited, for the
most part, to offensive punishments devised without specific authority by prison officials, not by
legislatures." Furman,408 U.S. at 384 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citing Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d
571 (8th Cir. 1968); Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967)).
307. Berger, supra note 29, at 566.
308. Id.

309. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173
(1976)).
310. See, e.g., Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102-03.
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punishment offends "contemporary standards, examining objective indicia
that reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction."31' In so doing, the
Court determines if the punishment violated the concept of the "dignity of
man." 2 Secondly, the Court requires a showing of subjective intent, i.e.,
deliberate indifference,313 on the part of prison officials, which the Court has
defined as a reckless disregard for the harm caused.314
Within the range of prison conditions cases, the Court has finessed this
test to deal with the differences in the alleged harm because of the
"contextual" nature of claims arising under the Eighth Amendment. 3 5 For
example, when a prison official injures a prisoner during a prison
emergency, the Court applies an even higher standard than the deliberate
indifference standard mentioned above. In such cases, a prisoner must show
that the prison official acted
sadistically and maliciously, "for the very
' 316
purpose of causing harm.
While the Court has developed these fairly nuanced tests, very few
opinions have specifically addressed the distinction between the words
"cruel" and "unusual," as used in the Eighth Amendment. Trop was one of
the first to do SO.317 In Trop, the Court addressed whether the "word
'unusual' has any qualitative meaning different from 'cruel' ' 318 Without
resolving the question, the Court noted that "if' the words differ in meaning,
"the meaning [of 'unusual'] should be the ordinary one, signifying
something different from that which is generally done. 31 9
Such analysis would be supported by the historical definitions of the
terms. "The word 'unusual,' in common use from about 1630, meant
'uncommon' or 'exceptional.'... The word 'cruel,' while it meant
'merciless' in the seventeenth century, also had in common usage a less
onerous significance as 'severe' or 'rigorous.' 320 More recently, the Court
stated that given the use of the word "unusual," rather than "illegal," the
clause forbids "cruel methods of punishment that are not regularly or

311. Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Let's Make a Deal: Waiving the Eighth Amendment by Selecting a
Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 32 CONN. L. REV. 615, 625 (2000) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428

U.S. 153, 173 (1976)).
312.

Id. (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173).

313. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991) (holding that in challenging conditions of confinement,
a prisoner must show deliberate indifference on the part of prison officials).
314. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (holding that prison officials may be held liable for
deliberate indifference by knowing the inmate "faces a substantial risk of serious harm" and
disregarding the risk).
315. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992).
316. Id. at 6 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (1972)).
317. A distinction between these words was made much earlier by the Virginia Supreme Court in
applying its version of the Eighth Amendment in the case of Commonwealth v. Wyatt, 1828 WL 860
*5 (Va. Gen. Ct. 1828) ("The punishment of offences by stripes is certainly odious, but cannot be
said to be unusual." ).
318. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101 n.32.

319. Id.
320. Lois G. SCHWOERER, THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, 1689, at 92 (Johns Hopkins U. Press
1981).
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customarily employed. '32' To determine whether a government action
qualifies as unusual, the Court has looked to such things as international
standards.322 We will now explore how these tests might apply to the cases
of Padillaand Martinez.
1. Are the Government's Actions "Cruel and Unusual" in the Cases of
Mr. Padilla and Mr. Martinez?

a. Padilla
In analyzing whether Mr. Padilla's detention is "cruel and unusual"
under the Eighth Amendment, an initial question that must be answered is
which, if any, of the Court's tests would be appropriate to use. It bears
repeating that in order to fully determine the extent of objective harm, the
government must open the doors to its conduct in detaining people as enemy
combatants. As it stands, the only fact that is indisputable is that Mr. Padilla
is being held incommunicado for the express purpose of establishing a
"relationship" between him and his interrogators.323 Though there are a
number of reasons to be concerned about what other interrogation conditions
the government may be subjecting Mr. Padilla to, this author will confine
her analysis to the known facts.324

321. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 976. Commentators have stated that the inclusion of the word
"unusual" in the amendment was due to sloppy draftsmanship. See, e.g., Granucci, supra note 36, at
855.
322. See Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 134; Atkins v. Virginia. 536 U.S. 304 (2003).
323. See Jacoby Declaration, supra note 7.
324. These concerns arise given reports of the possible torture deaths of two Afghan men during
interrogation at Bagram Air Base. Pathologists have concluded that these deaths were homicides
and "'blunt-force injuries' were found in both." AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, THREAT OF A BAD EXAMPLE: UNDERMINING INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AS "WAR ON

TERROR" DETENTIONS CONTINUE 12, available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index
/ENGAMR511142003 (last visited Feb. 2, 2004). These deaths are not the only reports of
interrogation misconduct. It has been alleged that the government has been keeping prisoners
"standing or kneeling for hours, in black hoods or spray-painted goggles." Prisoners also have
reportedly been "bound in awkward, painful positions," and deprived of sleep and necessary
medications. Paul Valley, The Invisible, THE INDEPENDENT, June 26, 2003, at 2; see also AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THREAT OF A BAD EXAMPLE:

INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS

AS "WAR ON TERROR"

DETENTIONS CONTINUE

UNDERMINING
13, available at

http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR511142003 (last visited Feb. 2, 2004); Defendant's
Notice of Motion and Motion to Suppress Involuntary Statements and Proffer in Support of Motions
to Suppress, United States v. Lindh, Crim. No. 02-37-A (2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com
/legalnews/us/terrorism/cases/index.html (alleging "incommunicado detention, food, sleep and
sensory deprivation. denial of a timely presentment before a magistrate; denial of clothing and
proper medical care; humiliation: and failure to inform Mr. Lindh of his rights, to name just a few").
There is also reason for concern given what is known of the treatment of other people detained as
material witnesses and those arrested for immigration offenses since 9/11, who have been kept in
severe conditions.

See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE

SEPTEMBER I I DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION

The purely objective analysis that is applied to those questions involving
statutorily enacted sentences seems to be the test that should be applied to
Mr. Padilla's situation. This test appears most appropriate because, though
not done pursuant to specific legislative authorization,325 the confinement
and interrogation are being done as the result of a deliberate executive
policy.3 26 Therefore, it is more analogous to cases such as Weems, which
focused on the validity of a statute, than Whitley, which focused on the
actions of an individual prison official.327 This is consistent with the intent
of the Framers, who specifically intended interrogation to be limited by the
amendment, in much the same way that they intended legislatures to be
limited in enacting post-conviction punishments.
However, because there is no statute that specifically authorizes this
conduct, the Court may look to the prison conditions cases for guidance.
Such reliance would be misplaced given the history of the Amendment and
the difference between a prison conditions case and one involving
incommunicado detention for the purpose of interrogation. 328 The history of
the clause and the definitions of the terms support the application of the
Amendment to detention when used to secure confessions.32 9 As such,
analysis of whether the punishment is cruel and unusual should depend not
on the mindset of the person inflicting the harm, but rather on the character
of the punishment involved.33 ° Under either test, however, the result in Mr.
Padilla's case would likely be the same.
To determine the objective character of this punishment, the Court
would focus on whether the punishment offends "contemporary standards,
'examining objective indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a given
sanction.' ' '33' This examination considers such things as the extent
of the
333
harm 332 and the national and international norms on such questions.

CHARGES

IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION

OF THE SEPTEMBER

11 ATTACKS

(2003),

available at http://news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/ins/usdojig060203rpt.pdf.
325. The executive does assert it is permitted to do so pursuant to the Authorization for Use of
Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40 (2001).
326. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 564 (noting that on June 9. 2002, the President signed an order
designating Mr. Padilla as an enemy combatant). "[T]he June 9 Order directs Secretary Rumsfeld to
detain Padilla." Id. at 572.
327. Compare Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1909), with Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S.
312 (1985).
328. It has been suggested that there is no basis for applying the Eighth Amendment to prison
conditions cases, either in the history of the Amendment or under the definition of punishment. See
Helling, 509 U.S. at 37-42 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Bukowski, supra note 130.
329. See supra Parts I1& IV.
330. Whitley, 475 U.S. 312.
331. Kirchmeier, supra note 311, at 625 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)).
332. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9.
333. Id. (discussing "society's expectation").
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The objective harm of solitary confinement3 34 has long been
recognized. 335 "[E]ven in 1842, people concerned about medical problems
of prisoners wondered 'does total isolation drive convicts insane?' 33 6 Since
that time, the psychological effects of solitary confinement have been well
documented. 337 Literature dating back to the late 1800s documents such
things as a "'hallucinatory, paranoid, confusional psychosis' with certain
characteristic symptoms including, inter alia, hallucinations, agitation, and
delusions. 338
A study on the "psychopathological effects of solitary
confinement" conducted on prisoners in the Massachusetts Correctional
Institute at Warpole, revealed that the "psychiatric symptoms.., were
strikingly consistent among the inmates. ' 339 "[I]nmates [in this study]

experienced a variety of symptoms including generalized hypersensitivity to
external stimuli, perceptual distortions, hallucinations, derealization
experiences, anxiety, difficulties with thinking, concentration and memory,

334. We must look to scholarship and cases dealing with "solitary confinement" because the
extent of Padilla's contact with others is unknowable given the government's insistence that not even
his lawyer can have contact with him. Should the actual facts of his confinement become known, as
well as their impact, such conditions would themselves need to be analyzed.
It is important to note that even though the Pentagon has agreed to permit Mr. Padilla's lawyers
to meet with him, the conditions that are likely to be placed on those meetings will prevent any
meaningful oversight of the interrogation process. As an initial matter, it is unclear how long it will
take to arrange these visits. It took approximately two months to work out the conditions for
attorney visits with Yaser Esam Hamdi. Kevin Bohn, 'Dirty Bomb' Suspect Gets Conditional
Lawyer Access, CNN.COM, February 11, 2004, at http://www.cnn.com/2004ILAW/02/l /padilla.
attorney.access/index.html. Additionally, Mr. Hamdi's lawyers were not permitted to talk to him
about the conditions of his confinement or the way the government has been treating or interrogating
him since his arrest. See Toni Locy, Accused combatant allowed to see lawyers, USA TODAY,
February 4, 2004, available at 2004 WL 58550731; All Things Considered,Analysis: US Citizen
Yaser Esam Hamdi Allowed to Meet with His Laswvers for the first time since being put into US
custody more than two years ago (NPR radio broadcast, February 3, 2004), available at 2004 WL
57376475. Finally, because the government asserts that such visits are purely discretionary, it can
prohibit those visits at any time.
335. See Nan D. Miller, Comment, InternationalProtection of the Rights of Prisoners:Is Solitar,
Confinement in the United States a Violation of InternationalStandards?, 26 CAL. W. INT'L L.J.
139. 155 (1995) (citations omitted).
336. Id. (citations omitted).
337. See id. In this instance, there is no way to know the extent to which Mr. Padilla is given
contact with those'humans with whom he can have contact. Even assuming he meets with his
lawyers, as noted above, it is unlikely he will be permitted to discuss the conditions of his
confinement as the government has so limited discussions between Mr. Hamdi and his lawyers.
Where, as here. the government prohibits the detainee's counsel from obtaining information to
present evidence on this question, it is reasonable that the government bear the burden of
demonstrating that it is not utilizing the adverse psychological consequences of isolation in a way
that violates norms of society.
338. See id. at 161 (citing Stuart Grassian. Psychopathological Effects of Solitary Confinement.
AM. J. OF PSYCH. (1983)), availableat http://www.prisoncentral/mental%20Illness/Grassian
/Psych%20Effects%20of%2oSolitary/Index.htm; see also In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 168 (1890).
339. Stuart Grassian, M.D.. PsychopathologicalEffects of Solitary Confinement. AM. J. OF PSYCH.
(1983), availableat http://www.prisoncentral/mental%20llness/Grassian/Psych%20Effects
%20of%20Solitary/lndex.htm.

and impulse control., 340 Other researchers have stated that "[t]he evidence
appears overwhelming that solitary confinement alone, even in the absence
of physical brutality or unhygienic conditions, can produce emotional
damage, declines in mental functioning and even the most extreme forms of
psychopathology, such as depersonalization, hallucination and delusions. 34'
These effects are not limited to those inmates who have no contact with
others.342 They have been shown to occur even in prisoners who are
confined in "small group isolation. 34 3
Thus, if these effects are present in Mr. Padilla or are sufficiently
imminent for him, 344 it would likely be recognizable as a violation of the
As Justice Blackmun has noted, the Eighth
Eighth Amendment.
Amendment's prohibition against the infliction of "unnecessary and wanton"
pain necessarily includes psychological harm. 345 "[T]he Framers also knew
'that there could be exercises of cruelty by laws other than those which
inflicted bodily pain or mutilation ..... ' Even though '[t]here may be
mental pain
involved no physical mistreatment, no primitive torture, severe
346
may be inherent in the infliction of a particular punishment.'
This recognition within the United States of the impact of solitary
confinement suggests that this treatment is "cruel" within the meaning of the
Eighth Amendment. Though solitary confinement may not be unusual in
that it does occur in the United States, its use in Mr. Padilla's case appears to
be unusual in its intent and implementation.347 Rarely, if ever, has the
government asserted the power to indefinitely detain its citizens
incommunicado for the express purposes of interrogation.
Additionally, solitary confinement is unusual under international
norms. 348 The Court has a long history of looking at the practices of other
countries to determine whether our governmental practices are unusual.349
This practice was re-affirmed by the Court last year in Atkins v. Virginia.35 °

340. Miller, supra note 335, at 162 (citations omitted).
341. Thomas B. Benjamin & Kenneth Lux, Solitary Confinement as Psychological Punishment,
13 CAL. W. L. REV. 265, 268 (1977).
342. See Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1230 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
343. Id. "[Slimilar effects have been observed in hostages, prisoners of war, patients undergoing
long-term immobilization in a hospital, and pilots flying long solo flights." Madrid, 889 F. Supp. 2d
at 1230.
344. Helling v McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993) (holding that a prisoner's Eighth Amendment claim
could be based on future harm).
345. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 16 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
346. Furman, 408 U.S. 238, 271 (1972) (citations omitted).
347. It is being done to secure information and has been going on for over a year.
348. See generally Miller, supra note 335.
349. See, e.g., Patterson v. Texas, 536 U.S. 24 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the
international consensus against executing juveniles); Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995)
(Stevens, J., mem. regarding denial of certiorari) (noting the decisions of the highest courts of other
countries); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (noting that no other "civilized nations of the world"
imposed the punishment at issue in that case). But see Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.l
(1989) (stating that it is "American conceptions of decency that are dispositive.").
350. 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 ("Moreover, within the world community, the imposition of the death
penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved.").
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Given both the extent of and intent in imposing this detention, and
international norms which also suggest it is unusual, a court could conclude
that Mr. Padilla's detention satisfies the objective requirement under the
Eighth Amendment analysis.
Subjectively, it is clear that the executive branch is acting intentionally
in detaining Mr. Padilla incommunicado. There is nothing inadvertent or
reckless in its actions. The government has stated that it specifically intends,
through its incommunicado detention of Mr. Padilla to create conditions that
will result in dependence upon his interrogators and the eventual release of
information.35 The incommunicado detention is intended to break his will
so as to obtain information from him.3 52 The government appears to intend
the harm that results from incommunicado detention to secure a benefit.
Thus, subjectively the government is acting in a manner that satisfies the
requirement that punishment be cruel and unusual. Because both the
objective and subjective components of a claim appear to be present here,
Mr. Padilla may well have a valid claim that his detention for interrogation
is cruel and unusual punishment and thus a violation Eighth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.
b. Martinez
In Martinez's case, there is even less information to analyze than exists
in Padilla. Unlike Padilla, whom we know has been held incommunicado
and interrogated for over fourteen months, for the express purposes of
obtaining information and deterring terrorist attacks, we have very little
information concerning the reasons for interrogating Martinez in the manner
done. Given this dearth of information, we can raise the important questions
concerning the Eighth Amendment analysis of Martinez's interrogation, but
these questions would necessarily require further factual development to be
answered.
From what is known, it is clear that Mr. Martinez's situation presents
different challenges under the Eighth Amendment. Unlike Mr. Padilla's
case, there was no objective indication that the police had a policy to shoot
suspects and then interrogate them during medical treatment in order to
facilitate the interrogation process. Instead, what is at issue are the actions
of an individual officer who decided to interrogate a suspect who had been
shot by law enforcement, while the suspect was being treated for those

351. In its request for reconsideration of the court's order allowing counsel access to Mr. Padilla,
the government argued that such consultation would "'jeopardize the two core purposes of detaining
enemy combatants-gathering intelligence about the enemy, and preventing the detainee from aiding
in any further attacks against America. . . .' That is, consultation would interfere with questioning,
and present the opportunity to use counsel as intermediaries to send messages to others." Padilla,
243 F. Supp. 2d at 44.
352. Id.

injuries.353 As such, Mr. Martinez's situation is more analogous to cases
arising in the prison context which look to the subjective intent of the actor
in engaging in the allegedly offensive conduct, such as where prison
officials actions during an emergency were alleged to be a violation of the
Eighth Amendment.354 Thus, the application of the subjective component
seems appropriate for Mr. Martinez.
In this instance, the objective component appears to be met. As Justice
Stevens stated, in his view, the interrogation "was the functional equivalent
of an attempt to obtain an involuntary confession from a prisoner by
torturous methods. '355 Thus, if Justice Stevens' reaction is indicative of a
societal reaction to this conduct, it is likely to be viewed as offensive to
human dignity.
An analysis of the subjective component in this instance is likely to turn
on evidence not presented in the Court's decision. Because there are no
cases in the Eighth Amendment jurisprudence that are analogous to this, it is
unclear which subjective standard the Court would adopt. The Court could
find the conditions of confinement cases appropriate for comparison because
it was the physical condition of Mr. Martinez in this instance that gave rise
to the problem.3 56 In such an instance, the standard adopted would be the
reckless disregard of the harm caused. If the Court determines, instead, that
the malicious and sadistic standard should apply because the injuries arose
as the result of the emergency situation,357 the standard would obviously be
higher.
In any event, it is unclear what motivation the officer had in continuing
to question Mr. Martinez when he was in such obvious pain. There could be
any number of reasons for this, including that it was malicious and sadistic.
However, because of the limited information on the subjective intent of the
officer, whether Mr. Martinez's interrogation violated the "cruel and
unusual" component of the Eighth Amendment is an open question.
It bears noting that in answering the claim raised by Martinez, i.e.,
whether the Fifth Amendment is offended by coercive interrogation, the
Court held that "[t]he text of the Self-Incrimination Clause simply cannot
support the.., view that the mere use of compulsive questioning, without
'
This is not true of the Eighth
more, violates the Constitution. 358
Amendment. The Eighth Amendment is offended by such questioning and
the courts should acknowledge the history of the Amendment and analyze
similar claims under its protection.

353. Chavez v. Martinez, 123 S. Ct. 1994, 2010-11 (2003).
354. See, e.g., Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
355. Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2010. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This
conclusion is not surprising given Justice Stevens' view that objective standards should be applied to
evaluate alleged violations of the Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 116 (1976)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
356. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
357. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 1 (1992).
358. Chavez, 123 S.Ct. at 2001 (emphasis added).
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IV. CONCLUSION

Human dignity is at the core of the Eighth Amendment protection
against cruel and unusual punishment. "[T]he Eighth Amendment is our
insulation from our baser selves. The 'cruel and unusual' language limits
the avenues through which vengeance can be channeled. Were this not so,
the language would be empty and a return to the rack and other tortures
would be possible in a given case." 35 9 As the above analysis demonstrates,
the origins of the Eighth Amendment reveal that it was intended to protect
against more than post conviction punishments. It is rooted not only in
concerns about post-conviction punishment, but also in the fear that the
government might use torture to extract information from its citizens. Given
this concem, and the realities of cases such as those of Mr. Padilla and Mr.
Martinez, the Eighth Amendment's lost origins must be explored and
applied to prevent the tortures of the past from being applied to the citizens
of the present.

359. Furman, 408 U.S. at 345.
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